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How should the Judiciary structure its reasoning in determining the amount
of deference it gives to executive-branch treaty interpretations? This question is
evermore crucial as international agreements, notably those related to the "war
on terror, " increasingly impact substantive areas that have been historically
considered solely domestic. This Article normatively assesses and ultimately
rejects established and recent scholarly approaches to treaty-interpretation
deference. For nearly half a century, courts have relied on a demonstratively
unprincipled and impracticable doctrine of giving executive interpretations
"great weight." Contemporary scholarly attempts to formulate more disciplined
approaches to deference have applied the administrative law doctrine of
Chevron-style deference and its two-step inquiry of "ambiguity" and
"reasonableness, " resulting in the theoretical and doctrinal triumph of a system
of ''.fx
z ed-point" deference. This Article argues that the particularities of treaty
formation and enforcement, especially their hybrid political-legal features,
demand a more flexible account of deference than has been delineated thus far.
The currently in vogue fixed-point theories of deference should cede to a system
that produces variable deference levels while maximizing each Branch's
institutional strengths.
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Introdu ction
How should

the

Judiciary

structure

its

reasoning

in determining

appropriate deference to executive-branch treaty interpretations?

This is a

crucial question for the rule of law in U.S. foreign relations, for constitutional
law, and for the creation of a calibrated approach to gauging and balancing
principles of separation of powers.
The current doctrine is obtuse.

The guiding principle is that the

Judiciary should give "great weight" to views of the Executive.

No one

knows what this standard means, and the Judiciary has expended little effort
in clarifying its position.

Academic commentary is varied and ultimately

unhelpful; some commentators argue that the standard means nothing while
others argue that it provides dispositive effect. Neither view provides a com
pelling justification for any reasoning underlying the standard's vagueness or

erratic application.

Devising a principled system of deference can be broadly contemplated
as a choice among three options: absolute deference, no deference, or a co
herent system operating somewhere between these two extremes.

The

systems of deference operating at the extremes, no deference and total
deference, are both unfeasible and constitutionally suspect. In between these
two extremes is the search for a principled standard of deference that har
nesses

the

institutional

virtues

of

all

governmental

correspondingly minimizes their institutional weaknesses.
leading

candidates

for

such

a

system:

branches

and

There are two

Chevron 1-style deference and

Skidmore2 -style deference. Recent academic theory in foreign affairs greatly
favors Chevron-style deference while dismissing Skidmore as Chevron's an
tiquated predecessor. Ultimately, adopting Chevron-style deference would
fail to solve many of the problems of the current doctrine while giving rise to
new headaches. Chevron-style deference is too deferential in some cases and
insufficiently deferential in others.

It operates on an artificial plane that is

not theoretically cogent in treaty interpretation and does not account for the
peculiarities of treaty law that may compromise its effectiveness.

Skidmore-style deference enables application of a flexible scale of
deference that is more appropriate to the particularities of treaty law and the

institutional balance that must be struck in a thicket of constitutional
questions. A Skidmore-style account of deference would assess:

( 1) whether

the treaty regulates executive power; (2) the type of international agreement
being interpreted; (3) whether the Executive possesses relevant expertise; and

(4) the process of enforcement and consistency (or inconsistency) of the
Executive's position.
The aim of this Article is to examine the doctrinal difficulties present in
contemporary treaty interpretation and articulate a theory of a principled

1. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
2. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).

Inc., 467 U.S.

837 (1984).

[Vol. 86:777
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form of deference, inspired by the factors described in Skidmore, that ad
dresses the characteristics of treaties and balances principles of separation of
powers and executive discretion.

The argument unfolds as follows.

Part I

highlights the urgent need for a coherent and cogent system of treaty
interpretation development demonstrated by U.S. policy in the "war on
terror," as well as the expanding realm of regulation through international
instruments.

Part II discusses the infirmities present in the current doctrine

of great weight deference and examines the historical and constitutional
foundation of the doctrine. Part III provides a norrnative assessment of vari
ous proposed models and argues that a more flexible form of deference
inspired by the factors outlined in Skidmore and its progeny in the adminis
trative law context represents a theoretically sound choice that addresses the
latent concerns animating the failure of great weight deference while pro
viding a structured form of deference well suited for application in treaty
interpretation.
II.

The Importance of the Deference Question
The question of the extent to which the Judiciary should defer to

executive interpretations in discerning the meaning of treaties has largely
been overlooked in favor of a broader assessment of the role of deference in
3
foreign affairs generally. As a result there has been scant academic attention
and divergent judicial application of treaty law, an area of law that has grown
increasingly important and pervasive over the past fifty years.
The meaning of law is inextricably tied to its interpretation. At its core,
deference is the ceding of one power in favor of another. As many scholars
have noted, in the twentieth century courts have granted more deference to
executive pronouncements in foreign affairs than ever before.4 Such in
creased deference is appropriate in some cases but inappropriate in others.

3. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
132 (2d ed. 1996) (highlighting the deference courts give to the statutory interpretations of the
.

political branches of government when evaluating matters of foreign affairs); Curtis A. Bradley,
Chevron Deference and f!oreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 650 (2000) (noting that courts have
generally employed varymg degrees of deference to the Executive Branch regarding foreign-affairs
matters m order to avmd the uncomfortable choice of either applying the law to limit the
.
.
mtematwnal p�wer of the
xecuttve Branch or abdicating their judicial function); Jonathan I.
Charney, Jud1c1�l Deference 1� Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. lNT'L L 805
.
, 805 (1989) (outlining the
spectrum of JUdicial prerogatives when deciding matters regarding
foreign affairs, from deferring
co�pletely to the Execul!ve Branch's position to disregard
ing the position of the Executiv e
entirely).

�

4. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as
Political Questions,
70 u. cow. L. REv. 1 439, 1442-45 (1999) (discussing

the increase in judicial deference during t he
.
century)· Robert M· Chesney, D.1saggregatmg
twentieth
Deference: The Judicial Po wer and
Execut1ve Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L REv.
1723, 1741-52 (2007) (outlining the
.
development of the U.S . supreme Court's
deference doctrine); G. Edward White, The
Transformation of the Constz. tutzonal Regime of
Foreign Relations 85 yA L REv 1 3 (1999)
. .
.
,
'
(documentmg the "tnumph of ' execu(
Ive dIscretwn m the consl!tutJonal regime of foretgn
reI atwns ").
·

•

.

·

.

·

'

·

·

·

·
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To date, the Judiciary has failed to provide any clarity in its doctrine for dis
cerning between the two.5

�s

the U.S. population and its government have grown and policy

questiOns have become more complex and persistent, law has not become
clearer. The interpretation of all types of laws and the behaviors they permit
and prohibit dictates who is punished, who is granted relief, and how indi
vidual s and institutions must behave.
A.

The Prol({eration a_{ Treaties in the Domestic Sphere
The importance of treaty interpretation has been brought to the fore due

to the increasingl y globally integrated nature of politics, economics, and
6
governance, as demonstrated by the proliferation of treaties, as well as the
content of U.S. policy in the ongoing "war on terror."
The latter half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty
first have demonstrated remarkable growth in international connectedness,

parti cu larly on political and economic fronts. The result has been a dramatic
proliferation

of

international

treaties,

both

bilateral

and

multilateral,

purporting to govern such diverse subject matters as state practice in warfare
(e.g.,

the Geneva

Conventions),

taxation

(typically

bilateral

treaties),

government corruption (e.g., the Convention Against Corruption), civil and
political rights (e.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights), criminal prosecution and civil litigation cooperation (e.g., the
7

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties), and many others.

As the substantive field covered by treaties grows, the importance of

treaties as instruments of domestic law is enhanced.

Concurrently, the

Executive Branch has gathered increasing power both domestically and
intemationally . 8
At the time the Supreme Court decided Missouri v.
9
holding that the federal government may regulate behavior it

Holland,

otherwise could not under the Tenth Amendment, 10 the idea of the federal

5. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1733 ("There is no question that a deference doctrin� of some
kind currently exists with respect to executive-branch treaty interpretations. But the precise nature

of that doctrine, its triggering conditions, and the obligations it imposes on judges are far from
clear.").

6. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON NOVEMBE R 1, 2007 (2007),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/treaties/83046.pdf (listing over 10,000 treaties and
executive agreements as "in force" within U.S. law).

7. See generally, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4,. U.N.
GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003); International Covenant on CIVll and
Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368.
..
8. See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, at xv, xv-xvu,
420-21 (First Mariner Books ed. 2004) (observing a long-term trend toward greater e�ecutJve
control over "the war-making power, the power of the purse, and the power of oversight and
mvestigation").
9. 2 52U.S.416(1920).
10. !d. at 435.
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an internation�l
government regulating purely domestic behavior through
cannot be said
same
The
ity.
possibil
treaty must have seemed an absurd
today.

Public debate regarding U.S. policy following the terrorist attacks of
9/11 has focused on the propriety of detaining terrorist suspects without trial,
appropriate methods of interrogation, standards in targeting and . methods of
.
warfare, and the use of military commissions. All of these subjects are In
strumental aspects of international humanitarian law and, in particular, the
Geneva Conventions, a treaty to which the United States has been a signatory
for over fifty years.

II

The US. "War on Terror"

B.

One of the essential questions since the beginning of the "war on terror"
been the extent to which U.S. treaties, especially the Geneva
Conventions, have influenced, restricted, and governed federal action in

has

pursuing terrorist suspects. The answer to this question largely begins with a
determination of which branch of government may act as the arbiter of the
meaning of treaties. Addressing the question of who interprets treaties nec
essarily affects other major questions of treaty enforcement, such as their role
in domestic law and the self-executing or non-self-executing nature of indi
vidual treaties. Treaties possess an additional layer of politics not present in
statutes: the relationship of the United States, as a singular nation, with for
eign states and their citizens.

12

This imbues treaty interpretation with the

sensitive political machinations of diplomatic policy and an aura that ac
countability to other foreign states and citizens as parties is lessened through
the very nature of their outsider status.

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,13 the
preeminent case thus far in the post-9111 world, is saturated with conce rn
over the role of courts as the final arbiters of the meaning of treaties.
However, Hamdan's conclusion poses more questions than it resolves.

1. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.-Hamdan v. Rumsfeld concerned an appeal to
the Supreme Court from an individual being detained as an alleged enemy

combatant at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.14 Hamdan
was a Yemeni national accused of acting against the law of war, designated
for commission in accordance with a November 13 2001 Executive Order
,
.
that authonzed the prosecutwn of laws of war in the "war on terror" through
.

11. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 4,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Pnsoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
12. See John Yoo, Politic� as Law?: The Anti-Ba
f
llistic

Missile Treaty, the Sep aration o
Powers, and Treaty lnte1pretatwn 89 CAL L REv 8
·
· ·
that
51 , 862 (2001) (book review
) (exp1ammg
.

.

.

.

'

treaties have reciprocal mtemattonal and legal
obligations).
13. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
14. !d. at 2761.

·

·

·
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The specific purpose of the

commissions was to provide a venue for the trial of individuals associated
16 Hamdan, like

with al Qaeda or otherwise engaged in terrorist activities.

many other detainees at the base, filed a writ of habeas corpus challenging
his detention and the procedures of the military commissions established by
the President and promulgated through regulations by the Department of
7
1
Defense.
This habeas challenge, like that of nearly all habeas challenges
emanating from Guantanamo Bay, included a series of claims under the
18
Geneva Conventions.
One claim in particular was that Hamdan's detention
was in violation of Common Article

3

provides:

of the Geneva Conventions, which

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum . . . the

passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording

all

the judicial

guarantees
9
1

which are

recognized

as

indispensable by civilized peoples.
Prior

to

Hamdan's

habeas

challenge,

the

President

issued

a

memorandum finding that individuals detained as affiliated with al Qaeda or

the Taliban were not entitled to protections under the Geneva Conventions/0

a cornerstone of international humanitarian law. 21
specifically applied to Common Article
President stated, "[C]ommon Article

3

3

The memorandum was

of the Geneva Conventions.

The

of Geneva does not apply to either al

Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant con

flicts are international in scope . . . .'m

15. !d. at 2759.
16. Military Order of

November 13, 2001: Detention, Tre atment, and Trial of Certain Non-

Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov.13, 2001).
17. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2 759.

18. /d. at 2762.
19 . Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 11, art.3, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. The Article is a "common" article as it is present in all four of the
Geneva Conventions. See id.; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, supra note 11, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention for the

Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces and in the Field, Aug.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.

20. Memorandum from President George W.Bush to the Vice President et al.(Feb. 7, 2002), in
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 134-35 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Orate! eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS].
73 TEXAS L.
21. See Susan L. Turley, Note, Keeping the Peace: Do the Laws of War Apply?,
and oft-quoted of
REV. 139, 141 (1994) ("[ T]he 1949 Geneva Conventions are the most well known
the laws of war .... ).
et al., supra note 20, at
22. Memorandum from President George W.Bush to the Vice President
"

134-35.

[V ol . 86:777
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In support of the President's memorandum finding that the Geneva
Conventions did not cover al Qaeda and Taliban members, the Executive
asserted that the conflict in Afghanistan was "international [in] c harac ter
and, as such, not encompassed by Common Article 3. 21 This view was
"

consistent with an explanation of the coverage of Common Article 3
provided by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to the President sh ortly fol
lowing September 11 th.24 In a memorandum from OLC to the President and
the General Counsel of the Department of

Defense, OLC im p li es that

Common Article 3 's application to "armed conflict not of an international
character" could be summarized geographically to mean "a war that does not
involve cross border attacks."25 The memorandum continues:
Common Article 3 's text provides substantial reason to think that it

refers specifically to a condition of civil war, or a large-scale armed
conflict between a State and an armed movement within its own
territory. First, the text of the provision refers specifically to an armed
conflict that a) is not of an international character, and b) occurs in the
territory of a state party to the Convention.

It does not sweep in all

armed conflicts, nor does it address a gap left by common Article 2 for
international armed conflicts that involve non-State entities (such as
an international terrorist organization)

as parties to

the conflict.

Further, common Article 3 addresses only non-international conflicts

that
war.

�ccur within the territory of a single state party, again, like a civil
6

Discerning the meaning and coverage of Common Article 3 played a

central role in the Hamdan decision at the trial court and in subsequent
appeals. The U.S. District Court ruled on the Geneva Conventions question
in favor of Hamdan, explicitly holding that the Conventions bequeathed indi
vidual rights and that such rights precluded Hamdan's trial in front of the
military commissions constructed under the President's order.27

The D.C.

Circuit reversed, holding squarely that the Third Geneva Convention (upon
which Hamdan relied) "does not confer upon Hamdan a right to enforce its
28
In making this determination, the D.C. Circuit cited
provisions in court."

23. !d. at 135, 134-35 (quoting Common Article 3); see sources cited supra note I 9.
24. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, Gen. Couns el of the D p 't
of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 20, at 81, 90 (explaining that the
conflict with a! Qaeda is of "an intemational character" because ''A I Qaeda operat es in many
_
_
countries and earned out a masstve mtemattonal attack on the Umted States on September 11 ,
2001").

�

25. !d. at 86.
26. !d.
27. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2 d 152, 160-62 (D.D.C. 2004), rev'd, 415 F.3d 3 3

(D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).

28. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749.
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the proposition that the interpretation of the Executive in the "construction
and application of treaty provisions is entitled to 'great weight. "'29

By the time Hamdan reached the Supreme Court, the implications of the
Court's decision were enormous.

The Supreme Court faced an objectively

reasonable construction of a treaty in wartime. The Court's determination of
the coverage of that treaty could impact U.S. wartime policy dramatically.
On June 29. 2006. th e Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's

decision and held that the President did not possess the requisite authority to
3
create a military-commission structure as had been constructed. 0 The Court
based this holding, in large part, on an interpretation of Common Article 3 of

the Geneva Conventions directly in conflict with the Executive's proffered
3
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, wrote flatly that the
view. 1
government's

reasoning

that

underpinned

its

interpretation

of

the

"international character" of the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban was
32 Instead, the majority held that the application to a conflict

"erroneous."

"not of an international character" refers to a conflict between a state and a
33
The great weight standard relied upon by the D.C. Circuit
nonstate entity.

as a central aspect of its decision is nowhere to be found.

The absence of the standard was not lost on the dissent.

Justice

Thomas, in a dissent joined in part by Justices Alito and Scalia, argued that

"the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies
3
charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight." 4
Justice Thomas continued:

[T]he Court, without acknowledging its duty to defer to the President,
adopts its own, admittedly plausible, reading of Common Article 3.

But where, as here, an ambiguous treaty pr ovision ("not of an

international

character")

is

susceptible

of

two

plausible,

and

reasonable, interpretations, our precedents require us to defer to the

Executive's interpretation?5

29. Id. at 41 (quoting United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989)).
30. Hamdan v. Rwnsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2763 (2006).
31. See id. at 2796 ("Common Article 3, then, is applicable here and, as indicated above,
requires that Hamdan be tried by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

32. Id. at 2795.
33. See id. at 2796 (" Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection, falling

short of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor
even a nonsign atory 'Power' who are involved in a conflict 'in the territory of a signatory. The
latter kind of conflict is distinguishable from the conflict described in Common Article 2 chiefly
because it does not involv e a clash between nations (whether signatories or not).").

34. Jd. at 2846 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Stuart, 489 U.S. at 369 and Sumitomo Shoji
Am., Inc. v. Avaglian o, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)).
35. Jd. The dissent then concluded that, even if applicable, Common Article 3 is already
satisfied under the President's military order and accompanying regulations. See id. at 2847 ("In
any event, Hamdan's military commission complies with the requirements of Common Article 3. It
is plainly 'regularly constituted' because such commissions have been employed throughout our
history to try unlawful combatants for crimes against the law of war.").

[Vol. 86:777
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In the view of the dissent, the case for deference was particularly strong
in this case where the Executive was "acting pursuant to his constitutional
authority as Commander in Chief

.

... "30

In other words, the pull of great

weight deference to judicial acquiescence should be heightened in the con
text of war.
2.

The

Military

incomplete without

Act.-The

Commissions

lesson

of

Hamdan

is

discussion of the

statutory regime it wrought, the
Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006. n While the majority opinion
invalidated the President's system of military commissions, Justice Breyer's
concurrence noted that "[n]othing prevents the President from returning to
Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary."1x
The

President

requested

and

received

explicit

congressional

authorization for a military-commission system for trying alleged enemy

combatants for crimes against the law of war through the MCA. 39

In addition to creating the infrastructure for a new program of military

commissions and amending the habeas jurisdiction available to detainees, the

MCA addresses the Geneva Convention interpretive issue by directly dele

gating to the President the power "to interpret the meaning and application of
0
the Geneva Conventions."4
The President utilized this power explicitly in a new executive order

outlining his interpretation of Common Article 3 as it relates to the ongoing

detention and interrogation of individuals
Agency.41
III.

by

the

Central

Intelligence

The Current Doctrine Is Insufficient
The

current

judicial

doctrine

interpretations is entirely unhelpful.

of

deference

to

executive

treaty

The standard, originally articulated by

Justice Black in Kolovrat v. Oregon, 42 is that while "courts interpret treaties

for themselves," it is important that "the meaning given [to treaties] by the
departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and

36. /d.
37. Military Commissions Act of2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
38. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
39. See Military Commissions Act § 3(a)(1) (establishing procedures governing the use of
military commissions to try alien unlawful enemy combatants violating the law of war and engaging
in hostilities against the United States).
40. /d. § 6(a)(3)(A). But see 152 CONG. REC. S10,399 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of
Sen. McCain, with which Sen. Warner concurred) (arguing that with reference to the President's
authority to engage in grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, "Nothing in this bill gives the
President the authority to modify the conventions or our obligations under those treaties").
41. See Exec. Order No. 13,440,72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007).
42. 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
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enforcement is given great weight.''4
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The intrinsic tension present in the

preeminent case creating the modem judicial doctrine of treaty-interpretation
deference has only been heightened by subsequent judicial practice.
Courts have often stated that the views of the Executive Branch on the
meaning of a treaty in question arc "not conclusive."44 The empirical data on
the matter

show

otherwise.

interpretation cases between

In

his

1986 and

study

of

Supreme Court treaty

1999, Professor David Bederman

concluded that of the twelve cases the Court faced, "in all but one the holding
followed the express wishes of the executive branch of the govemment."45

One commentator has suggested that the question of the degree of deference

to the Executive in interpreting (and thus enforcing) treaties is dependent on
"who is accused of being the party in breach and the perceived competence
6
of the judiciary to offer a remedy. "4

A.

The Doctrine of Treaty Interpretation at the Founding: Little Deference
Is the great weight standard derived from any generally understood

conception of constitutional intent or meaning?

Neither the constitutional

text nor early case law indicates any such derivation.47 There is remarkably
little text in the Constitution detailing the division of powers between the
Branches in foreign affairs. Article II governs the creation of treaties through
sub mission by the Executive and supermajority ratification by the Senate.48

Article VI, the Supremacy Clause, establishes treaties as the "supreme Law
of the Land" alongside the Constitution and the laws of the United States.49

Article III provides U.S.
adjudication.50

domestic

courts with jurisdiction

over their

43. /d. at l 94 .
44. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., v.
Avagliano, 457 U.S.176, 184-85 (1982)).

45. Bederman, supra note 4, at 1465 (emphasis omitted).
46. Tim Wu, Treaties' Domains, 93 VA. L.REv. 571, 573 (2007).
47. Professors Sloss and Yoo offer conflicting views of the originalist view of treaty
interpretation deference. Compare David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty
Interpr etations: A Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 506-07 (2007)
(surveying judicial decisions of treaty construction in the first fifty years of the Supreme Court and
concluding that the Court at this time period utilized a no-deference standard toward executive
interpretations of treaties), with John C. Yoo, Rejoinder: Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens
of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305 (2002) (using, inter alia, a textual and structural analysis of
the Vesting Clause to support the proposition that an originalist understanding of the Foreign
Affairs power would place the task of treaty interpretation within the Executive Branch rather than
the Judiciary).

48. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur ... .").

49. See id. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the

United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ).
"

50. See id. art. III, § 2, cl. l ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority .... ) .
"
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The Federalist Papers also offer little: guidance in unearthing a precise
division of power over the function and execution of treaties as supreme fed
eral law.

In Ft!deralist No. :n. Alexander Hamilton asserts. "The treaties of

the United States. to have any ton:e at all. must be considered as part of the
law of the land.

Th eir true import. as f�tr as respects individuals. must, like
�1
asce rtained by judicial dctcm1inations."
Hamilton also

all other laws. be

suggested, ''The power in question [t h e treaty power] seems ... to form

a

distinct department, and to belong properly. neither to the legislative nor to
.

the executive. "52

R a ther instead of tre at i e s representing an enactment of
.

ne w laws, the objects of treaties :

are CONTRACTS with foreign nations which have the force of law
but derive it from the obligations of good faith.

,

They are not rules

prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between
sovereign and sovereign. . . .

The qualities elsewhere d etailed as

indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations point out the

executive as the most fit agent in those transactions . . . �u
.

The early American Supreme Court did not appear to possess the

theoretical conflict typified by contemporary academia and courts. On the
54
one hand, the Court's famous decision in Marbury v. Madison also pro

vided a basis for broad discretion to the Executive in foreign affairs by

noting:

[T]he President is invested with certain important political powers, in
the

exercise of which he is to

use his own discretion, and is

accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his
own conscience. . . .

The acts of ... an officer [appointed by the

President], as an officer, can never be examinable by the courts.55

One might think that the making of treaty interpretations within the context
of the exercise of presidential powers in foreign affairs, and national security

in particular, might be exactly the type of "political powers" that would re
quire great deference or even abstention. However, other cases decided by
the Supreme Court soon after the Founding indicate that the Court granted

the Executive little to no deference in matters of treaty interpretation.56 Dur

ing the first fifty years of the Republic, the Court faced nineteen cases in

which the U.S. government was a party and proffered an interpretation of a

treaty. The government's proffered interpretation was accepted in only three
of those cases.57

51. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 51, at 451.

53. Id. at 450-51.
54. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
55. !d. at 165-66.

56. See Sloss, supra note 47, at 506-{)8, 506 & n.59 (listing and discussing early cases decided

by the Supreme Court).
57. !d.
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The reasoning behind the early American Court's decisions betrays a
view of the interpretation of treaties as a conclusively judicial function. The
Amiable Isabella, 58 a case concerning a Spanish ship captured during the War
of 1812, presented a government interpretation of a treaty between the
United States and Spain.59 The government argued that the ship was not im
mune from capture.60 This position led to substantial commentary in the
majority and the dissent. Justice Story wrote that the core of the controversy
was "the interpretation of a treaty which we are bound to observe with the
most scrupulous good faith, and which our Government could not violate
without disgrace, and which this Court could not disregard without betraying
its duty ."61 The dissent concurred in this aspect of the judgment, finding that
"the views of the administration ... are wholly out of the question in this
Court" and that it was of no matter "whether [the Court's interpretation of the
treaty] chime[s] in with the views of the Government or not."62
Founding Era courts did not provide deference to the Executive even in
questions directly implicating national security issues. In United States v.
Laverty, 63 the United States had detained individuals believed to be enemy
aliens in Louisiana. 64 The treaty question at issue was whether the admission
of Louisiana as a state implicitly granted citizenship to those residing in the
territory prior to statehood.65 In determining the answer to this question, the
court referred to the treaty with France that provided the United States with
the Louisiana Territory. 66 The government argued that the indigenous people
of Louisiana (Creoles) were not citizens due to noncompliance with other
citizenship regulations.67 The majority decision in the case reviewed the
treaty, which required admission of the native people "as soon as possible" as
citizens, and found that a contrary reading would render the United States in
violation of the treaty.68 The finding implicitly rejected the government's
preferred reading of the text.
B.

Treaty Interpretation in the Contemporary Court: Near-Total Deference

If not originalism, what explains the move from the extraordinarily
limi ted deference of treaty interpretation during the nation's infancy to the
great weight deference practices subsequent to the Kolovrat decision in

58.
59.
60.
61 .
62.
63.
64.
65 .
66.
200).
67 .
68.

19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) I (1821).

!d. at 6.

!d. at 14.

!d. at 68.

!d. at 92 (Johnson, J., dissenting).

26 F. Cas. 875 (D. La. 1812) (No. 15569A).

!d. at 875.

!d. at 876.

na, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat.
See id. (discussing the Treaty for the Cession of Louisia
!d. at 876-77.

!d. at 876, 876-77 .
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1 96 1 '? The i mp l i c i t j ust i ficat ion appl!ars i n st i tut ional in origin. girded by the

belief that in stitutio n a l benefi t s o f t he E.xl!c u t i vc i n e x ecu ting treaties out
weigh any advantages o f and wou l d t h us he

co unte

rman ded

by, judicial

interference i n the a b i l i ty of the federal government to act s wi ftly and "speak
in 'one voice "' in foreign a mt i rs.1''l
The case

law of t reaty- i n terpretat ion

de ference fo l lowing Kolovrat

sheds little l ight on a structu red app l i cation of the great weight standard.

Empirical ly, courts invoking the standard have rou t i nely acquiesced to the

In t h i s sense. the great wei ght
standard has portended. if not ana lytically ju stified. a victory for the execu
interpretation advocated by the Execut i ve. 'o

tive view, despite j udicial i n s i s tence t h a t it main t ai ns an independent role.

The background of this determination seems to indicate several possible ra

tionales for this recent deference:

matters of foreign affairs;

( I ) a concern over judicial competence in

(2) the enormous value placed in the ability of the
( 3 ) the increasing consolida

Executive to be flexible in foreign a ffairs; 7 1 and

tion of power into the Executi ve Branch and away from both the Legislative
and Judicial Branches. 72

The emphasis on the role of the Executive in foreign affairs has not
In the twenty-odd years

rendered the great weight doctrine any clearer.

following the decision in Kolovrat, the Court would assess the Executive 's
interpretation within the framework of its previous pronouncements on the

subject, as well as for i ts consistency with the plain meaning of the text. The

twin principles in tension in Kolovrat-the judicial power to construe treatie s
set against the great weight given t o executive determinations-slipped dra
73
matically to favor the Executive in the latter part of the twentieth century.

69. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J.
1170, 1202 (2007 ) ; see id. (reviewing courts ' reasons for giving deference to the Executive in
foreign-relations cases and concluding that "the underlying justifications are often Jess textual than
functional, based on traditional practices and understandings" of institutional competency ) .
70.

Professor Robert Chesney has conducted a n extensive study o f cases demonstrating the

sometimes inconsistent, but often highly deferential, appli cation of great weight deference by the
courts. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1775 (listing cases from 1984 through 2005 in which courts

� �

i dicating a high fre quency of cases invoking great weight in
.
.
which the court adopted the Executive s treaty mterpretatwn) . However, the decision of whether or
not to invoke the standard itself may be less of an analytic exercise than results justification. Courts
facing treaty-interpretation questions that do not invoke the great weight standard are far more
likely to interpret a treaty contrary to the Executive's position. See. e.g. , Hamdan v . Rumsfeld 126
en aged the deference doctrine an

�

M

iele
S. Ct. 2749, 2795-97 (2006) (holding that, contrary to the Executive 's assertions, Common
3 of the Geneva Conventions ap plies to an alien captured in connection with the United States '
conflict with a! Qaeda).

71. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 69, at 1 20 2 .
72. John S. Baker, Jr., Competing Paradigms of Constitutional Power in
Terrorism, " 1 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 5, 5-6 (2005).

"The

War on

73. Such substantive limitations were fatally compromised following the Court 's d ecision in
v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 ( 1 992). In Alvarez-Machain, a defendant abdu ct
ed
from Mexico and brought to the United States to face criminal charges asserted that the U.S. action
was in violation of the U.S. extradition treaty with Mexico, which did not authorize removals a bsent
Mexico's consent. Jd. at 657-58. For another example of great weight treaty interpretation by the
United States
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In addition to the large number of cases in which the Court actually

grants deference to executive interpretations, the Court ' s nominal forays into

explaining the great weight standard have tended toward extreme deference.
74
The Court 's decision in Sumitomo Sh(�ji A m erica, Inc. v. A vagliano demon

strated the Court ' s will ingness to defer to an executive-branch interpretation
even in the face of inconsistent interpretive practices within the Executive.75

The Court similarly proc laimed the importance of great weight deference

even in circumstances where the treaty text at issue was not considered
7
ambiguous. 6
Under cases like Swn itomo and Stuart, the Court's doctrine seemed to

establish the concept that great weight, in its most simplistic form, meant that

the executive interpretation triumph s .
subsequent cases

standard

as

interpretation.
C.

This simplicity was undermined by
8
ignoring77-and then undermining7 -the great weight

dependent

upon

the

reasonableness

of

the

Executive 's

The Conundrum of Doctrine Without Theory
The development of the case law over the l ast

fifty

years indicates that

the driving force behind the Court's inconsistent approach to deference in
treaty interpretation i s based on institutional concerns rather than any devel
oped theory.

when

(1)

In essence, the Court engages in its own interpretive method

the question presented is amenable to textual construction and

(2)

the contemplated e ffects o f a decision contrary to the Executive's interpreta
tion would not b e serious.

When the C ourt b e lieves that it is well equipped to settle a properly

presented question of textual construction, it engages in interpretation alone.

When enough concerns arise about the potential foreign effects of an inter

pretive decision, it defers .79

Rehnquist Court, see Jte/ Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 ( 1 993), which
rejected the petitioner's challenge to the Executive's proffered treaty interpretation as inconsistent
with earlier practice.
74 . 457 U.S. 1 7 6 ( 1 982 ) .
7 5 . See id. at 1 84 n. l O, 1 84-85 (demonstrating the Court's deference to the State Department's
treaty interpretation even though it was initially "ambiguous").

76. See United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 3 5 3 , 366-70 ( 1 989) (relying on an Internal Revenue
Service interpretation of a treaty despite previously finding that the meaning of the treaty was plain

on its face).

Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 133, 133-3 5 (1 989) (rejecting the
77. See Chan v. Korean
Executive's argument that a "drafting error" accounted for a discrepancy between the correct
text).
interpretation of a treaty and its clear
.
Ltd.
v. Tsu1 Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 1 55, 1
es,
Airlin
68 ( 1999) ("Respect is
78. See El Al Israel
ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an
international treaty.").
g a descriptive claim that judicial enforcement of
te 46, at 5 73 (m
79. See Wu, supra no
rlly on who is accused of bemg the party in breach and the perceived competence
mai
treaties "turns
).
of the judiciary to offer a remedy"

�
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Th is tension

is con s i stent

wit h the concep t ual di fficulty posed by

treat ies as both po l i t i cal and k·gal i n struments.

Courts are institutionally

designed for t he practical application o f legal norms bur ill suited to balanc
ing political i n terests, espec ia l l y when those poli t i cal i ntere sts
nature.

are foreign in
.
Treat ies, i nt rinsica l ly both po li t it a l and legal, thus pose a spectal
·

chal lenge to courts i n disentang l i n g those competing threads.
Judicial deference in fo reign a mt i rs outside the treaty context is infused
with the hes itance to i mpac t f(>re ign a mt i rs .
itself in

the

doctrines.lw

creat i on

of a

variety

This hes i tance has manifested

of nonjust i cia b i l i ty

and abstention

Nonjusticiab i l i ty and absten t i o n doctrines have been controversial as
acts of j udicial modesty.H1 Justice Douglas criticized excessive deference to
the Executive

as

rendering the

Judici ary

"a mere errand boy

for the

Executive Branch which may choose to pick some people's chestnuts from
the fire, but not others ' . "82 Ironically, the in determinate nature of the Court's
deference doctrines has turned the current critique into one in

which the

Judiciary, rather than the Executive, makes the final decision as to each
petitioner' s "chestnuts. "83
Whatever the motive, case law throughout all divisions of the Judiciary

demonstrates quite convincingly that j udges genuinely struggle with a
cern

that

foreign-affairs

questions,

"different" from other law. 84

particularly

treaty

questions,

con
are

Advocates of broad deference to the political

branches in foreign affairs generally, and treaties in particular, have empha
sized this concern in their writings. 85

80. Among these are the act-of-state doctrine and the political-question doctrine (largely dead
within the context of domestic affairs).

8 1 . See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U.
1 3 95, 1 396 (1 999) (arguing that courts are not qualified to engage in assessing the

CoLO. L. REv.

effects ofjudgments on foreign affairs).

82. First Nat'! City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773 (1 972) (Douglas, J.,

concurring).

83. See Goldsmith, supra note 8 1 , at 1422 (characterizing this justification as indicative of the
"lawlessness" of the foreign-relations-effects test, whether applied by the Executive or the
Judiciary).

84. See, e.g. , Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 1 03, I l l ( 1 948)
("[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. . . . They are
delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. . . . They are decisions of a kind for
which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility . . . . "); Att'y Gen. o f Can. v.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc ., 268 F.3d 103, 1 14 (2d Cir. 2001 ) ("When a foreign nation
appears as a plaintiff in our courts seeking enforcement of its revenue laws, the judiciary risks being
drawn into issues and disputes of foreign relations policy that are assigned to--and better handled
by-the political branches of government.").

85. See Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 7 1 , 130-34 (2000) (discussing the argwnents
against an active judicial role in foreign affairs, particularly that courts are institutionally
incompetent in such matters and that sufficient political safeguards already ex ist); Yoo, supra note
_
.
47, at 1315 (arguing that considering the treaty power as another type of leg1slattve
power would

Rethinking Treaty I nterpretation

2008]

793

The inverse of c oncern over judicial inc ompetence is a high valuation of
the institutional capacity of the Executive B ranch to act sw iftly in times of
crisis

and

alter

foreign-affairs

practice

in

response

to

changing

circumstances. This value is typically encompassed in praise of retaining the
Executive' s "flexibil ity" in foreign affairs.xo
Executive flexibility, however, is not an exc lusive goal, even in times of
war or national emergency.

It is one value among many institutional values

enshrined in the Constitution.

A c oherent separation-of-powers system re

quires recognizing and optimizing institutional powers to determine and
provide meaning to the role and interpretation of treaties in U . S. law.
IV.

Creating a Theory of Operation
There are three basic approaches to providing structure to the judicial

doctrine of deference: no deference, total deference, or an intermediate
standard.

Each of these approaches is l imited in elasticity.

Total- and no

deference approaches require all circumstances of treaty interpretation to fall
within tightly bound limits. Chevron -style deference, a popular intermediate

option, recognizes a limited need for elasticity in deference but translates

imperfectly from the strictures of its administrative context, due to its genesis

as an instrument of congressional delegation and the procedural requirements
that accompany the logic of this genesis.
Fundamentally, deference involves a willingness to acquiesce one's

power in favor of another and an assessment of the wisdom of doing so.

Wisely providing deference requires recognizing and balancing the particu
larities of the genre in which deference is requested and the institutional

advantages and concerns that may counsel the exercise of deference.

The heightened academic concern of preserving executive flexibility

may reflect current world events. Substantial executive discretion is of value

in conducting foreign relations. However, the focus on this institutional
value of the Executive should not obscure other institutional values inherent
to the Judiciary that act to sharpen, and thus enhance, rule-of-law principles
central to constitutional precepts of separation of powers.

This P art provides a brief assessment of institutional values at stake in
both the Executive and Judicial Branches and then examines the prominent
proposals of deference along the spectrum, from total deference to no
deference. Eliminating the options at the extremes, which are both legally
suspect and likely to be inappropriate in most circumstances, this Part pro
poses a new approach to ascertaining a middle ground in the context of treaty
interpretation.

contradict the Fr amers' understanding o f the separation o f powers between the Legislative and
Executive Branches).
86. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LrBERTY , AND THE COUR TS 1 6 1-81

(2007) (defending the judicial-deference approach against
various alternative approaches regarding the President's exercise of emergency powers).
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ls-Chevron-style and
examines two existing defer ence mode
treaty i�terpretation. Adapt�d
Skidmore-style-and their applic abilit y to
nce IS the current academic
from administrative law, Chevron-style defere
i le in �ssessing th� con
darling; however, as this Part outlin es, it is inflex
m the Implementation of
cerns that animate excess ive executive interference
ed into near-total
treaties. As a result, while its exercis e has been pervert
both over- and
deference, its application in foreign affairs suffers from
re, properly ar
underinclusiveness. In contrast, deferen ce based on Skidmo
offers a
treaties,
ticulated and converted to assess the particul arities of
It

�

and
flexible model of deference most likely to balance competing interests
Branches.
the
of
leverage the core competencies and institutional advantages

A.

Discerning Legal Thresholds a n d Institutiona l Values

proper scope of deference is
institutional preferences. In
and
determining the line between legal dictates
circumstances where the Constitution so requires, deference may be neces
A prerequisite

to

determining

the

sary even if a host of institutional values counsel for robust judicial inquiry.
In that vein, deference to the Executive is at its strongest when the
action or judgment at issue is within the exclusive power of the Executive to

determine . In the treaty context, such a situation arises when a court is asked
to determine whether a foreign nation remains part of a relevant treaty
regime.87

Similarly, a court defers to the judgment of "international facts"
Such concerns are

that may be material to determining treaty content.88

considered exclusively within the province of the Executive as the politic al
9
branch charged with execution of the foreign policy of the United States .8

More controversially, deferring to an executive interpretation of a treaty
may be judicially advisable even when not required by other law. Institu
tional concerns impose themselves with greater frequency and urgency as the

p rely legal basis for deference becomes more ambiguous.90 It is in those
�
Circumstances where assessing the institutional values of choosing to act or

87. See, e.g. , Then v. Melendez, 92 F.3d 8 5 1 , 854
(9th Cir. 1996) (deferring to the
i. �terpretattons of the S�te Department in determining that a valid extradition
treaty existed between
Smgapore and the Umted States); see also Bradley, supra note
3, at 660 (explaining that the
Sup�eme Court ha� accepted as legally binding the Executive
Branch's decision on whether a
foretgn natwn contmue s to remain a party to a treaty).
88. Bradley, supra note 3, at 66 1 , 661-62; see also,
e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242
_
_
( 1 984) (notmg foretgn mterest m
economic sanctions targeting Cuba).
89. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 659-63 (discussing
a variety of situations in which the courts
_
generally defer to the Executive
Branch in its handling of foreign affairs).
90 . See, e.g. , hesney, supra note 4, at 1 732 ("[T]he
re is considerable confusion with respect to
.
the obhgahon to give at least some deference to executiv
e treaty interpretations"); Jide Nzelibe, The
_
_
Umque
ness of Fore1g
n Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REv . 94 1 975
(2004)
. (p. roposmg a compararive' .
. .
.
institutionalism approach t0 anaIyzmg
.
the pohtlcal-queshon doctrme m
.
the context of foreign
affatrs).

�

·
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91
to defer is most crucial. I ssues of treaty interpretation are difficult precisely
because they go beyond the threshold question of whether the case can be
heard �nd venture into the territory of how the treaty should be applied, as
_ the courts. Examining the core competencies of each Branch
law, wtthm
including institutional structure and values, helps clarify how each Branch
should function in the realm of treaty operation.92
1.

The Institutional Values and Deficiencies of Executive Action.

Flexibility, accountability, and specialization are the core institutional values
offered by the Executive in foreign affairs.
a.
Flexibiliry. -As a single branch with an unmistakable hierarchy
leading to one person, the Executive possesses an inherent flexibility un
matched by the other branches of government. The Judiciary, steeped in
precedent and dependent upon the happenstance of cases and controversies,
is unable to act expeditiously. To a similar end, the Legislature is
multitudinous, slow, and comprised of various interests and backgrounds.
Flexibility enables the Executive to act quickly in a time of emergency, to
alter application or enforcement of legal agreements it executes, and to en
gage in a number of other politically oriented actions to serve policy goals.

Executive Branch is democratically
accountable. In addition to elections, the President is accountable to his
political party and motivated by a quest for historical legacy. Further, the
personnel that make up the Executive are typically individuals whose future
is tied to the perceived success of the administration. This accountability
makes the Executive more responsible to the voters for failures and sensitive,
nuanced political assessments than the Judiciary.
b.

Accountability.-The

the Executive Branch is the primary
governmental actor involved in both drafting and implementing treaty law.
These actions naturally lead to a consolida tion of legal an� pragmati� knowl
edge as to the operation of international instruments. Th �s power IS . not by
. _
c oncep�wns �f
accident. As evidenced b y federal ist writings and JUdicial
_ � , with their
treatle
of
gation
deference to the Execut ive Branch, the promul
inherent international reach, is inextricabl y part of the provmce of the
.
.
93
Executive's prerogative to operate the federal foreign-aff:airs power.
c.

Specialization. -Finally,

early Court's
9 1 . See generally Nzelib e �upra note 90, at 967-75 (systematically criticizing the
·
�•
. alist" approach to the problem and
c.
wn
t
· approach to the foreJgn-af
..
mterna
e
rmaltst
'o
h
t
power,
fatrs
.
advocatmg a comparative
�he "liberalist" response to the internationalist approach, and
mstitutionalist analysis) .
.
· 1ude d m this Part are not exhaustive m nature
me
·
· ctes
92. The institutional values and deficJen
.
u
but rather designed to highlight core institutional concerns and values present m determ ung a
system of deference.
93. See supra notes 20--2 1 , 85-89 and accompanying text.
'

.

·

.

.

.
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The drafting role of the Executive creates an ini ial and unli mited power
.
.
of interpretation over treaty law. While the draftmg power IS subject to

�

agreement with other parties, the Un ted St tes' pos tion as world hegemon
.
creates unequaled negotiating power m craftmg multi l ateral mstruments and,

�

�

�

of course, bilateral treaties. The execution o f negotiating power and drafting
decisions forms a crucial initial interpretation of the provisions being created.
Drafting decisions include choosing broad and ambiguous terminology or
precise language; choosing words between varying analogues; including or
deleting differing provisions; and structuring the language to imply the envi
sioned right or remedy contemplated.

The choice between an individually

possessed right and an explicitly diplomatically enforced remedy can be
weighed and determined among the parties.
At the conclusion of the drafting process, the Executive possesses the
exclusive authority to determine whether the treaty it crafted will proceed to
ratification. During this stage, the Executive determines whether it will sign
94
the treaty and whether it will present the treaty to the Senate for ratification.
The President then chooses whether he wants the instrument to take the
form of an Article II treaty or prefers the flexibility of an executive

agreement. 95

Assuming the Senate ratifies the treaty, the Executive assumes the
Everyday compliance with U.S.

burden of executing the treaty obligations.
treaty obligations

o ccurs

through

the

administration

of the treaty by

Executive bureaucracy .

Other signatories will look to the Executive when
96
they believe a breach has occurred and exert pressure to ensure compliance.
In short, the everyday decisions as to the meaning of U.S . treaty obligations
fall, in the first instance, to the Executive bureaucracy.
The role of treaty administration also implies correlative determinations

�f ho:V the. treaty will be executed and enforced internally. Such determina
tiOns �var�abl y require the bureaucratic actors and their supervisors to make
detenrunatt�n s as to t�e relative importance o f varying provisions and their
.
capabthty

own

to Implement compliance policy effectively.
These
enfor ement (and nonenforcement) dec i s ions frame the development of
meanmg of these provi s ions and the j udicial cases that flow from government

�

action (or inaction).

94. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 .

95. Avoiding ratification procedures enab les th e p
·
·
agreements
resident
to create International
.
.
.
With other nations With t�e m st minimal interference
of other branches of government. But see
?
K. etea , The P eszdent s Rational Choice of a Treaty
's Preratification Pathway: Article II,
:
;
ongresswna -Executzve Agreement, or Executive
Agreem ent? 3 1 J LEGAL ST UD SS S l 2-1 6
·
·'
·
·
(2002) (outlining reasons whY a ratwnal, unhty-maxumzmg
'
President may desire to forego an
.
·
executive agreement and attempt to gam
·
congressiO
nal
approval for ratification in confonnance
.
WI· th Artic 1e II requrrements).

�hn �

·

·

·

·

·

96. This burden is not limited to self
. -execufmg treaties.

Non-self-executing treaties may, m
eat r b de on the xecutive as other
signatories pressure the Executive to craft and
E
�
ur
i p l ementmg provisiOns of such a treaty
.
·

fact place a
�
Pas legislati

�;

·
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Conversely, the structure of the Executive also creates institutional
shortcomings. Executive action is made under intense time pressures, with
highly incomplete information and with motivations designed to maximize
power and flexibility rather than adherence to law. Institutional values of the
other branches check these shortcomings. Values of the Judiciary are of par
ticular relevance to this Article.

The Institutional Values and Deficiencies of Judicial Action. -The
Judiciary offers quite different institutional values than the Executive. The
disaggregatcd nature of the Judiciary results in diverse considered review
that ultimately produces a long-term perspective on policy goals, promotes
uniformity of decision, and enhances the overall legitimacy of law.
2.

a. Long-Term Perspective.-The fact that federal judicial
appointees serve life terms, together with the basic judicial doctrine of stare
decisis, encourages judges to consider the long-term effects and legal impli
cations of their judgments through a much different lens than that of the
short-term-focused political branches. While purely political actors are
highly motivated relative to short-term political judgments, j udicial action
tempers such short-term judgments through the political insulation of a life
term and the obligation to justify future deviations from present judgments.
b. Diversity.-The federal Judiciary consists of hundreds o f jurists
chosen from presidential administrations spanning from present day to the
Truman presidency. These judges carry with them substantially different
life, intellectual, and legal experiences that influence their jurisprudence.
The exchange of judicial opinions from various federal district and appellate
courts plays an important role in the ultimate decisions of the Supreme Court.
In addition to the natural-selection element of intellectual analysis each
opinion may engender, the large span of experience represented in the
Judiciary establishes continuity over time as executive administrations and
legislative bodies revolve.

c. Promoting Uniformity.-The judicial doctrine of stare decisis
and judicial modesty typically lead to very few contenders in legal
interpretations. Court decisions, while ultimately vulnerabl e to changing
judicial opinion, are structural ly and procedurally more enshrined than ex
ecutive determin ations that are easily discarded from administration to
administration or, m certain political circumstances, within an
administration. 97

97. See generally RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, FOREIGN POLICY ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS ( 1999), http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/6 1 72.htm (discussing different methods by which the
Executive and Congress affect foreign policy).
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Bush
Geneva

Conventions, a unilateral executive interpretation of international obligations
is often viewed as subjectively biased rather than o bj ectively reached.

In

in world opinion polls.98

an

contrast, the diverse, politically insulated federal Judic iary fares much better
Beyond basic popularity, the perception of

independent, structural check on executive power in foreign a ffairs assists in

creating an aura of legitimacy surro unding the impl ementation of interna

tional law.

Conversely, the structural disaggregation and limited hierarchy of the
Judiciary lead to divergent opinions, slow legal process, and a generalism
that precludes routine and consistent experience-based application of spe

cialized knowledge. Critics of judicial review of executive actions in foreign

affairs argue, reasonably, that judicial action can act as a restraint on execu
tive power that could otherwise be used to effectuate American policy

goals.99

This is undoubtedly true and o n l y makes the current doctrinal mo

rass more disconcerting.

These institutional characteristics of the Judiciary result in better, more
Some of these benefits

transparent national policy making in foreign affairs.

have long been recognized as inherent benefits in the domestic realm. Their
importance is not diminished in the context o f the enforcement and interpre
tation of U.S. treaty law.

Instead, the procedural uniqueness of treaty law

indicates a heightened importance in accruing the benefits bestowed by in
stitutional exchange with the Judiciary.

Ultimately, the institutional value of ensuring executive flexibility is
.
Important. However, it should not b e inflated to the extent that it nullifies the

institutional values enshrined in constitutional principles of separation of

powers and inherent in meaningful j udicial review of executive action. This
is true even i n matters of national security.

�

The cha l nge of crafting a principled structure of treaty interpretation
�
.
. com? mng
hes m,
competing values o f flexibi l ity of the Executive, as the
�
.
atiOn s pohtlcal act�r on the internatio nal stage, while effectuating the legal
�
ns
� ��ments that treaties represent within our constitutional structure through
.
JUdicial review.

98. See, e.g. , World Opinion Roundup
, http :/fbi og.washmgtonpost.com/worldopinionroundup1
.
2006/07/guantanamo reac t'Ion seen as us html (J 1 26
uY
2006, 1 2 : 3 8 EST) (discussing positiVe
reaction to the Supr
.
e Co
ruli
i U� tted States v. Hamdan among world newspapers ); see
also Joseph Carroll, Slim Ma ·ori o A
Appro_ve of the Supreme Court, GALLUP, Sept 2 6,
2007, http://www.gallup.c m/p IV287
Maj onty-Amencans-App rove-Su reme -Court .aspx
�
(highlighting a national opinion p oil giving
the Supreme Court a 5 1 % approval ratmg, as compared
with President Bush' s 36o10
; approva1 rat'mg and c
.
ongress s 2 4o1
;0 approval ratmg)
.
99. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra
note 8 6 a t 2 7 2 ("To be abl e to r spond to m emat1onal
�
crises, the president cannot be hemmed in b
.
Y mtematwnal treaties and constitutiOnal hm!tatwns, as
interpreted by judges.").
-

-

�

urt

: �

� ;

}

,

·
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'

·

.

'

_

�

·

2008]

B.

Rethinking Treaty Interpretation

799

The Extremes of Deference

Theories of judicial deference fall on a spectrum bounded at the
extremes by no deference and total deference. Reviewing the extremes is
important because the doctrines established through case law, as explained
above, have gravitated toward one pole or the other dependent on the circum
stances of the time.
The key advantage to systems operating at the extremes of the deference
spectrum lies in their simplicity. This simplicity, however, also leads to
some of the most glaring aspects of inappropriate deference or nondeference.
The inelasticity of the approach of each of these systems, fixed either at the
pole ofjudicial supremacy or executive discretion, renders both systems con
stitutionally suspect in addition to pragmatically undesirable.
1. No Deference.
So me commentators advocate a system in which the
Executive is granted no deference in the interpretation of treaties. Propo
nents of this model generally decry any movement away from de novo
review of interpretive questions as an abdication of the Marbury prerogative
of the Judiciary to "say what the law is." 100 Such commentators view the de
novo judicial review of treaty interpretation questions as a crucial check on
executive power. The primary benefit o f such a system would be its innate
simplicity and insulation from political manipulation. Such a system,
however, is ultimately unfeasible and potentially infringes upon the Article II
and Article I powers of the President and Congress, respectively.
A no-deference policy is unfeasible primarily because it unreasonably
hinders executive operation in implementing treaties. It is ultimately unde
sirable because while it creates a robust buffer in consolidating executive
power, it also unjustly impedes deference where it is appropriate and
desirable. As disputes over treaties are infrequent relative to those over
domestic statutes, the ability to rely upon an established and implemented
interpretation can be crucial to effective foreign policy. The Executive
Branch is empowered with the routine enforcement and execution of treaty
obligations. Its diplomatic corps routinely operates under the interpretations
of the Executive, and regulations are promulgated in reliance on those
interpretations, a reliance that would break down in the face of complete
judicial authority to reinterpret.
Providing no deference to executive interpretations could also constitute
an infringement of the Article II powers of the President to exercise
-

100. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.

(I

Cranch) 1 3 7, 1 77 ( 1 803). For example, Thomas Franck

describes the Judiciary 's retreat from cases involving "political questions" as a "Faustian pact."
THOMAS M. FRANCK POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY
TO FOREIGN AFFAIR ? 1 3 , 1 0-1 3 ( 1 992); see also, e.g., Bradley, supra note 3, at 665 ("Almost
invariably these

�

commentators

[criticizing judicial

deference to the

importance of the 'rule of law' and quote reverently from Marbury. . . .

executive]

invoke

�he

[They] use phrases like

'judicial abdication ' and talk about the courts having made 'Faustian pacts. "' (citing FRANCK,
supra, at 1 0- 1 1 and Bederman, supra note 4, at 1 442)).
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pretation. The independent power of
executive powers relat ed to treaty inter
ing was demonstrated through the
the Executive to prov ide interpretive mean
the Anti- Ballis tic Missi le Treaty
controversy over the reinterpretation o f
the Sovie t Union . 101 In 1 985,
(ABM Treaty) between the Unite d State s and
would , in the future, read the
President Reagan asserted that the Execu tive
ed to develo p a missile
ABM Treaty to allow technologica l work design
no avail. 1 03 The ultimate
defense system. 1 02 Many in the Senate dissen ted to
in part, due to in
success of the execut ive reinterpretati on of the treaty was,
ons that, by their
herent power that adheres to the executi on of treaty provisi
.
.
4
"
10
very nature, contam amb 1gmty.
system could violate Article l powers of the
ence
Similarly, a no-defer
to
Legislature in circumstances where the Congress has utilized its power
5
define and punish crimes against the law of nations, 1 0 taken steps to define
6
U . S . treaty obligations and limitations, 1 0 or delegated power to the Executive
to promulgate regulations. 1 07 As an example, it would be folly for the courts

to reject an executive interpretation where that interpretation was endorsed
by Congress or represented the exercise of clearly delegated powers from the
Legislature. 1 08

As noted above, a no-deference approach may have held considerable

sway immediately following the Founding, but the political circumstances
and doctrine have moved decisively away fro m the approach.

Instead, the

Court has embraced a doctrine much closer to total deference .

. �·

Total

Deference. -Proponents

of total

deference

highlight the

politiCal nature of treaties as a part o f international relations as well as the
flexibility and democratic accountability of the Executive.

Under a total-

'

1 0 1 . Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems U . S . -U . S . S . R. , May 26 1 972 '
'
23 U.S.T. 3435.
02·
ol Hongju Koh, Wh;: Do Natio s Obey International Law?, 1 06 YALE L . J . 2599,
� .
264
2
( 997) (book review) (outlmmg
the Reagan Administration's proposed
.
"remterpretatlon" of the ABM Treaty, which would in essence have amended the treaty without the
consent of either the Senate or the Soviet Union).
103. !d. at 2646--48 .
1 04. !d. at 2647.
.
. hmg
105. See U.S. CONST art I § 8 ' cI 10 (estab l Is
that Congress shall have the power to
.
.
·
. ·
"de fim� and pumsh Prracles
and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law
of NatIOns,) .
106
art. II, § 2• cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by
·
and with the A dvice and
. ,
h S ate , to make Treaties
C
provide d two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .
a ed
107· !d. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 8 (establishing Congres s's power
to "make all Laws which shall be
.
necessary and proper for carrymg mto Execution the foregoing
Powers").
108 . Hamdan serves as an example where the c ourt
found such delegation lacking in the
context of the Uniform c0de 0f M"li
1 tary Jushce. Hamdan v. Rumsf
eld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774-75
o
r, that he Court recognized that Congress did delegate some authority to
ga
, proce ures, and substanhve law under U.S. courtsmartia l. !d.

� �:�� �
•

.

·

'

1:·
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deference system, the courts defer to treaty interpretations of the Executive
regardless of their form or apparent inconsistency with treaty text or practice.
Under total deference, flexibility to conduct foreign affairs is
tantamount. Advocates of sweeping deference argue that the political nature
of treaties and changing landscape of international relations require the
. to be able to change its interpretation of treaty obligations on the
Executrve
109
fly.
Legally, advocates contend that the treaty power is "executive in
nature" and that it includes a structural power to interpret treaties
independent from judicial infringement. 1 10 According to this argument, the
fact that the Executive is the center of gravity in treaty interpretation as a
practical matter is enough evidence that the consolidation of all treaty
interpretation concerns should be confined within that Branch. 1 1 1
Functionally, the total-deference model places enormous strain on the
institutional values present in executive action and correspondingly little
value in judicial action. A model of total deference maximizes executive
flexibility, resulting in a system of completely unchecked power over treaty
interpretation, which would inevitably lead to manipulation and, ultimately,
widespread treaty failure. 1 1 2
The legal basis of a total-deference regime is also questionable. A core
holding of Supreme Court jurisprudence is that an independent role of the
Judiciary is required in interpreting treaties to provide meaning to federal
law. 1 13 In the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Sanchez-Llamas v.
1 14
Oregon,
the Court examined the extent to which U.S. courts are bound by
decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) relative to the Vienna
15 While not deciding the issue
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). 1
109. See Yoo supra note 12, at 870-77 (providing examples of the Executive 's ability to better
adapt to the turbulent landscape of international relations, such as the notion that the President's
decision-making processes can take on degrees of speed, secrecy, flexibility, and efficiency that no
other governmental institution can match).
1 10. See. e. g. , id. at 869 ("Article Il's Vesting Clause must refer to inherent executive and
judicial powers unenumerated elsewhere in the document.").
I l l. !d. at 870.
1 1 2. It is easy to imagine that after repeated instances of treaty "reinterpretations" rendering
treaty violations lawful, the treaty partners will react similarly in retaliation. A rejoinder to this
concern would contend that as long as those politically accountable are making that decision, they
can be held responsible in the course of elections. This rebuttal is only effective to the e�tent o�e
.
believes that such accountability will preclude "reinterpretatiOns" generally. Alas, most evidence IS
to the contrary, essentially demonstrating that the political branches are the most likely to follow the
path most politically expedient at that moment. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal
ranch [rom Within, 1 1 5 YALE L.J.
Separation of Powers: Checking Today 's Most Dangerous
. .
23 14, 23 1 9-22 (2006) (discussing perverse incentives in declSIon making by the political branc�es).
As such, short-term calculations are likely to sacrifice long-term policy goals, such as generalized
,

f!

treaty compliance and good faith.
1 1 3. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 1 26 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006) ("If treaties are to be give.n
effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal law IS
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
1 1 4. 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
1 15. !d. at 2684-85.
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right of actio n, the Court rejected the
of whether the VCC R created a private
1 16
to the ICJ ' s holdings in
petitioners ' reque st for substantial deference
any v. United States of America/ 1 7 and Case

LaGrand Case (Germ
� States of
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexic� v. Unite
118
the tmpact of
Without a private right of action , the questto n of
America) .
R hinged, in part, on
the VCCR and the ICJ j udgments interpreting the VCC
nondele gation. To
the Supreme Court' s understanding of j udicial power and
noted: "[I]f
this end, the maj o rity opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts
system,
treaties are to be given effect as federal law under our legal
the
determining their meaning as a matter of federal law ' is emphatically
province and duty of the judicial department ' headed by the ' one supreme
"1 19
Court' estab hs
" h e d by th e c onstltutton.
.

.

Accompanying the Court' s protective stance from foreign interference
is an assertive positioning of Article III powers against interference from
This conception is underlined
1 20
to Justice
by Chief Justice Roberts ' s favorable citation and parenthetical
121
i n which the Court held: "At the
Stevens ' s opinion in Williams v. Taylor,
other branches of the domestic government.

core

of

j udicial]

[the

responsibility-independent

federal

power

is

the

from

its

coequal

courts '

branches

in

independent
the

Federal

Government, and independent from the separate authority of the several
1 22
Despite the consistent triumph of execu
States-to interpret federal law. "
tive interpretations over the past fifty years, likely in part because of the
reluctance of the Judiciary to completely
interpretation

(as

demonstrated

by

cede all powers over treaty
like

cases

Sanchez-Llamas),

total

deference has also not been in favor.
C.

The Search for a Principled Standard ofDeference

The infeasibility and constitutional infirmities of no-deference and total
de fer�nce regimes have led to a more considered approach to developing a
_
pnnctpled system of deference that maximize s institutional benefits of the
�ranches. The system sought must be "principl ed" in its offering of guide

hoes and rules that can be readily ascertained and applied by judicial means.
here �e two systems of deferenc e, already present and applied in
_
Amencan JUrisprudence, that serve as primary candidates for transp lantation
to the realm of treaty interpretation: Ch evron style deferen
ce and Skidmore
style deferen ce. The academic literature to date has heavily favored Chevron

�

-

!d. at

2685-86.
1 16.
1 1 7 . 2001 466 27)
3 1 ).
12
1 1 8. 2004
9
o�
�chez-L
lamas,
?
1
2
6
1 77 1 8 )
120.
121. 529 362 (2000).
122.
I.C.J.

I.C . J.

(June

.

(Mar.

S. Ct. at 2684 (quoting Marbury

!d.

U.S.

!d. at 378-79.

v.

Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137,
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de�erence as the preferred alternative to the morass of great weight, while

Skidmore deference has
I.

Chevron

been largely unexamined.

Deference.-In

recent

years,

several

scholars

have

attempted to fill the theoretical void of deference in foreign-affairs law with
the already-built administrative law doctrine of deference articulated in

Chevron

Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (commonly
Chevron deference). 123 Chevron deference, as articulated by the

US.A.

known as

famous decision that thrust it to prominence, consists of a two-part inquiry.
First, has Congres s directly decided the precise question at issue? 1 24 Second,
if Congress has not so spoken-if the statute is silent or ambiguous with re
spect to the specific issue-was the agency's decision at issue reasonable and

thus permissible? 1 25

Assuming the text i s ambiguous and the views of the

Executive are reasonable, the executive interpretation triumphs.

a.

Chevron 's

Operation.-The Chevron

standard of "ambiguity"

and "reasonableness" could, at the theoretical level, cut toward broad or lim
ited deference. The test generally collapses into a reasonableness inquiry, as

it is unlikely that an agency interpretation that acts directly contrary to un
could be considered reasonable. 1 26
As a result, the

ambiguous text

deferential nature of

reasonableness.

Chevron

is dependent upon the judicial interpretation of

To date, the courts have consistently interpreted the term to

offer near-total deference to agency decisions when
gation of authority can be inferred;

(3) procedural

( l ) congressional dele
(2) agency specialization is evident; and

safeguards are respected. 1 27

Deference and

Professor Curtis Bradley 's piece, Chevron

Affairs,

starts his proposal for

Chevron

Foreign

deference from the premise that the

theoretical framework articulated by Chevron translates comfortably to for
eign affairs. 1 2 8 Professors Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein extend Professor
Bradley 's argument into a more-broad-based functional and theoretical call

123. E.g. , Bradley, supra note 3, at 679 (focusing on three types of foreign-affairs law to which
Chevron deference should apply: federal statutory law, both treaty-based and customary
international law and the federal common Jaw of foreign relations); Posner & Sunstein l'llpra note
69, at 1 228 (c ncluding that courts should defer to executive interpretatio ns of ambiguous
enactments and that because clear legislation is controlling under Chel'ron step one. nothmg m that
.

.

�

argument excludes the possibilit y that Congress is entitled to the last word).
124. Chevron U. S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837. 842 ( 1 984).

125. !d. at 843.
of' the Chevron
126. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: A n Empirical Study
.
g court
998)
(analyzm
1
(
1
30-3
,
I
REG.
ON
J.
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1 5 YALE
agency
uphold
courts
of
majority
l
substantia
a
finding
and
doctrine
applications of the Chevron
interpretations, especiall y when courts reach the question of reasonableness).
.
2 7 ) (applymg versiOns
127. See, e. g. , Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 49 1 , 501-04 (5th Cir.
of the
of these three factors when determining the reasonableness of the agency s mterpretatJOn
.

�

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).

.
d ference pnnct ples and values fit
See Bradley, supra note 3, at 703 (arguing that Chevron
_
r).
comfortably within the realm o f foreign affairs generally and treaty mterpretatton m particula

128.

-

�

.
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ly �ll asp�cts of forei gn-rela ons law
for applying Chevron deference in near
.
ques tiOns signtficant to the war on
and, in particular, appl ying it to
of Chevron deference goes beyond
terror." 1 29 Posn er and S unstein' s view
nistrative r� alm and argues that
traditional j ustifications present in the admi
.
.
s due to the mstJtu
Chevron deference is p articularly suited to foreign affair
tive over other branches of
tional advantage s posse ssed by the Execu
1 30
government.
that Chevron is an
The thrust of these commentato rs ' arguments is
both the unique
appropriate system of deference becaus e it acknowledges
through a politi
ed
expertise of the Executive in foreign affairs and is generat
, the doctrine
cally accountable mechanism, the Executi ve Branch . 1 3 1 Further
established
iar,
amil
f
its
carries with it practical benefits that accrue through

��

position in administrative law. 1 32
b.

Chevron

Chevron deference

as Excessively Deferential.-The

common critique of

in the context of treaty interpretations is that it is too def

erential to executive interpretations.

The question of whether a doctrine is

excessively deferential is only answerable by assessing whether the stated
goals and justifications of the proposed system of deference are achieved.
Proponents of

Chevron

deference p lace great importance on the role of

the Judiciary in ascertaining the "reasonableness" of executive interpretations
in the face of "genuinely ambiguous statutes . " 1 33 In practice, however, this
role is largely illusory. At the theoretical level, adopting

Chevron

deference

in foreign affairs places great weight on genuine ambiguity and reasonable
ness determinations, concepts that are subj ect to interpretive differences of a
wider variety than substantive limitations. 1 3 4 The practical level bears out the
theoretical

As

concerns.

Professors

Schuck

and

Chevron

empirically, relatively few cases in which

Elliott

demonstrate

is applied result in a

1 29. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 69, at 1 1 77 n. 14 (distinguishing the approach offered

by Professor Bradley).

1 3 0. !d. at 1 176-77.

�? 1 .

?

See radley, SUP_ra ote 3, at 673 (explaining that the Executive is particularly well suited
,
Interpretive lawmakmg because it has "more expertise and
democratic accountability than
courts"); Pos er � S
tein, supra note 69, at 1 1 77, 1 1 76-77 (arguing that the resolution of
statutory ambtgmtles m this context reqmres
·
""JUdgments of pohcy and pnnc1ple"
·
and that the
.
.
.
Executt e as both the fore1gn-pohcy
expertise and the "constitutional warrant" for making those
underlymg Judgments).

for

�
�

.

�ns

·

�

·

�

1 32· S eci c lly, the doctrine has been the subject of substant
ial scrutiny and has gathered an
.
mcrease d eve
proced al clarity as a result. The Judiciar
y
is
familiar with the doctrine and
.
presumably comwrtable wtth 1ts application.

t t;
�

�

1 3 3 . Posner & Sunstein supra note 69 at 1 22 6 Wh"
'
tle not a "proponent" of Chevron deference
"
·
•ore1gn
m
· c
af
·
taus,
professor Robert Chesney asserts · that
Chevron "preserves a re 1ative
· gful
· 1y meanm
degree ofJ·ud·!Cia
· 1m
· dependence. , Chesney, supra note 4
at 1 766
134. See Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katya1 ' D ·
lSregardmg Foreign Relations Law, 1 1 6 YALE
.
.
L J 1230 1269 (2007) (cntlqu
· ·
mg the apphca
t10n of "genuinely ambiguous" or "vague and
am 1guous standards (quoting Posner & Sunstein,
supra note 69, at 1 2 1 7, 1 227))
'

.

'

·

·

b.

.

' ,

.
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judicial finding that the agency interpretation is "unreasonable." 135 A stud
by Professors Sunstein and Miles indicate that "on both the Supreme Cou
and the courts of appeals, the application of the Chevron framework is
greatly affected by the j udges' own (political] convictions. . . . [T]he data
reveal a strong �elationship between the j ustices' ideological predispositions
.
that they will validate agency determinations."136 Judicial
and the probability
practice in other foreign-affairs nonjusticiability and abstention doctrines is
in �t�ctive and indicates that it is likely that the deference afforded b y judges
.
Chevron in the treaty context would be based on an internal assess
ut1hzmg
ment of the foreign effects of their decisions that they are least likely to
accurately gauge. 1 3 7

�

Chevron as Insufficiently Deferential-The overarching
difficulty with Chevron is that its principles do not extend to the
particularities of treaties. Ultimately, the problem with Chevron deference
may not be solely that it provides too much deference to the Executive, but
that in certain circumstances, it clearly does not provide enough deference to
executive determinations.
There are a host of conceivable c ircumstances that could arise where
deference would be desirable but where Chevron would not apply under es
tablished norms of deference. 138 Consider an executive interpretation of a
treaty articulated purely as a litigation position. Under traditional concep
tions of Chevron deference, litigation positions are not entitled to any
deference. 139 The same would be true when the interpretive view is traceable
to an executive o fficer or division that does not appear to have expertise in
c.

1 3 5. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of

Federal Administrative Law, 1 990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1 057-59 (finding that circuit courts deferred to

agency dec isions at a higher rate after Chevron was decided-a rate that shows it is very unlikely an
agency 's interpretation will be deemed unreasonable if entitled to Chevron deference).

136. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical
Investigation ofChevron, 73 U . CHI. L. REV. 823, 825-26 (2006).
1 37. See Goldsmith, supra note 8 1 , at 1 396 (arguing that the foreign-relations doctrines involve
judicial identification and assessment of the foreign-relations interests of the United States and
predicting "the effects of certain acts . . . on these interests").
1 38. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 1 87 236, 23 1-47
�
(2006) (noting the problems with the Supreme Court's current framework for dec1dmg when to
apply Chevron deference, including its apparent endorsement of an "exception" from Chevron
deference for "major questions" of statutory interpretation that in the Court's view require judicial
review) .

1 39. See, e.g. , United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 2 1 8, 234 (200 1 ) (holding that
.
classification rulings issued by the U.S. Customs Office are not entttled to Chevron efe:ence
because they are more akin to policy statements, agency manuals, and � nforceme�t gmdelm�s);
Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Crr. 200 1 ) ( Upon readmg
Mead, we find that a litigation position in an amicus brief, perhaps just as agency interpretations of
statutes contained in formats such as opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines are entitled to respect only to the extent that those interpretations have the
power to persuade pursuant to Skidmore." (citation omitted)).

�
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the subject matter regulated140 or was not generated through an accountable
mechanism. 1 4 1 The political nature of treaties might counsel for broad defer
ence in such circumstances despite

Chevron 's

inapplicability.

For example,

even if not subj ect to notice-and-comment rule making and articulated as a

litigation position, the Executive may be engaged in regularized dip lomatic
_
efforts that require reliance on a particular interpretation of the treaty m order

to

gain

corresponding

specialization,

deference

political
may

be

advantages

appropriate

Even

abroad.
in

such

absent

circumstances.

Otherwise j udgments forming a consistent diplomatic process would be in
j eopardy, thus requiring a change in diplomatic practice and imposing a sub
stantial burden on the Executive in conducting foreign policy .
One might think that the answer to the difficulty of utilizing traditional
conceptions of

Chevron

Chevron

in foreign affairs is to expand the already-expansive
142
doctrine to cover any executive interpretation in foreign affairs.

The inextricable difficulty of expanding the contours of Chevron deference is
that the administrative law principles establishing the doctrine are structured
to preclude abus e o f the broad deference

Chevron

already affords.

Preclud

ing such abuse is j ust as important, if not more so, when one considers the

underappreciated legal nature of treaties, formed in large part outside of ex
ecutive

control

and

substantive provisions .

often

containing

important

d. The
Difficulty in
Translating
Interpretation.-The j ustifications of Chevron

executive-constraining

Chevron

into

of exploiting

Treaty

executive

expertise and preserving executive flexibi l ity are both compromised under an
expansive view of

Chevron

deference .

A cornerstone of the

Chevron doc
( 1) been

trine is based o n the belief that administrative agencies have

?elegated _interpretive authority by Congress and (2) possess unique expertise
m

the subj ect matter in which they are regulating. 143

140. Here Gonz les v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243 (2006) is instructive. In this case the Court
.
.
reJected an mterpretlve position offered by the Attorney General due to
lack of medic;! expertise.
!d. at 268-75 .

�

1 1 . See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U . S . 576, 5
8 8 (2000) (holding that an agency
. �
opmiOn letter was not entitled to Chevron deference because
it was not subject to notice-and
comment rule makmg) .
142· This i s essentially the position o f Posner and
Sunstein. Compare Posner & Sunstein
supr note 69 at 1 1 7 7 n. l 4 (advocating for the
application of Chevron deference to
�
re!atIons doctnnes b ased on theoretical and funct10na
·
1 reasons such as the Executive's "superior
· fi
·
rf
r latio s"), wi h Bradley, supra note 3, a� 673,
673-74 (arguing, on largely
.
o
ha app ng a , hevron perspective" to foreign-a
ffairs cases would provide a
valuable frarnew�rk fior un erstandmg many of
the foreign-affairs doctrines and impose legal
· fi ·
constraints on the Execut1ve while accounting for execur
1ve expertise and authority m
affairs).

?

�:���:� ; =��� �

foreign�

r
�

�

C:

·

ore1gn

.
143. See Chevron U.S.A . Inc. v. Natural Res
D ef C ouncli, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 ( 1 984)
.
(explaining that Congress has de1egated po 1.Icy
·
·
making respons1"bTt.
I 1 1es to agencies, m part because
. , .
.
.
those agencies possess "great expertise m theu
respective areas ).
·

·
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hen viewed through the analytical lens of maximizing administrative
.
.
flextbthty, the Ch vron model does quite wel l . It is very uncommon for an
.
agency mterpretat ton to be overturned once i t is found to be entitled to
Chevron defercnce. 1 44 The promise of substantial deference also frees the

\_\'

�

agen cy to e gagc in comprehensive regulatory schemes with little concern
.
that Its core mtcrpretive holdings will be overturned.

�

However, many treaty regimes do not fulfill either of these elements of
the expertise equation.

Unlike administrative law, treaties are not executed
145
delegation of interpretive authority from Congress.

an implicit
w it
.
Stmtlarly, most treaties to which the United States is a p arty are not

�

a

enab le to the routine and consistent application by a core group of profes
.
Sionals msulated from the larger political machinations of the Presidency.

�

Chevron

deference is only justified to the extent that Congress has, at

least implicitly, delegated lawmaking authority to another body for the pur
1 46
4
pose of administering specific law.
Under United States v. Mead Corp. 7
agency interpretations only receive

/

Chevron

deference when the congres
148
sional intent in delegation was "to carry the force of law."
In assessing
whether the admini strative agency had received the proper delegation, the
Court indicated that full and fair process should underlie administrative

144. See supra note 1 3 5 and accompanying text.
145. Unlike questions as to the content of customary international law, treaties form part of the

"supreme Law of the L and" o f the United States . U . S . CONST. art. VI. This status embeds treaties
as

part of the domestic legal landscape alongside the Constitution and statutes of the United States.

146. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron 's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT.

REv. 20 I , 2 1 1 (characterizing application of the Chevron doctrine as subject to a judicial finding of

"indicia of contrary congressional desire" regarding deference to agency authority). Subsequent
decisions and academic commentary have mainly divided the potential rationale for deference into
three elements. First, administrative agencies possess unique expertise and flexibility in their field

of operation.
Judicial interpretations rejecting administrative counterparts would hinder
administrative operation by requiring a congressional act, or higher judicial action. Such contrary
interpretive decisions would be more numerous absent robust deference. Second, the resolution of
"gaps or ambiguities" in federal law should be left to an institution politically accountable for its
actions . Interpretive acts inherently require policy judgments that the Judicial Branch is least

equipped to make.
Finally, the complexity of the administrative state and p lethora of policy
judgments left to Congress has meant that the Legislative Branch intentionally delegates the task of
interpretation to the relevant agency. This delegation enables the agency to utilize its institutional
benefits of flexibility and expertise clothed with the authority of legitimate power. See generally,
e.g. , Laborers' Int'l Union v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 391 n. 1 2 (3d Cir. 1 994) (listing
two paramount rationales for deference as expertise and congressional intent); Mich. Citizens for an

lndep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1 285, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1 989) (listing two mai� rational�s for
ake polIc� deciSions),
deference as agency expertise and a preference for political br�nches to
.
f'd by an equally divided Court, 493 U . S . 38 ( 1 989); Fed. ElectiOn Comm n v. Christian Coal., 52
af
F. Supp. 2d 45, 82 n.40 (D.D.C. 1 999) (listing two leading rationales for deference as agency
expertise and a preference for political branches to make policy decisions because of political
1,
accountability); Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58 BAYLOR L.
.
A.
mtent);
Nma
nal
congressiO
and
ility,
accountab
1 9-20 (2006) (listing rationales of expertise,
Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 1 02 MICH. L. REv. 737, 743-44 (2004) (same).

�

�v.

147. 533 U.S. 2 1 8 (200 1 ) .
148. !d. a t 22 1 .
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.
S uc h an I mP 1·I ed
torce o f I aw. " 1 49
&:
regulations desig ned to "carry the
_
find in the treaty con �ext. Treat Ies
delegation would be factu ally diffic ult to
_
infreq uently requi re executive
that primarily besto w individual rights
.
.
dmintstratwn.
1 50
a
e lemen t are unlike ly to
Similarly, treaties with a quasi -contractua l
sary to trigger Chevron
invoke the type o f delegative authority neces
of the treaty rati fication
deference. 1 5 1 Delegated authorization i s not part
treaties as
Unlike admin istrative regulations, the creation of
process.
through advice and
supreme federal law requires the interac tion of C ongress
ure, issues of
Legislat
the
m
consent . 1 52 Rather than implicit delegat ion fro
through
treaty interpret ation are expressl y address ed by the Senate
devices
tive
interpre
These
53
1
.
ons
reservations, understan dings, and declarati
provide a compellin g ex ante approach that acts expressly against unilateral
executive

interpretation

and

provide

the

Branch

Legislative

with

an

opportunity, at the very moment of ratification, to define the nature of the
j udicial enforceability of the treaty at issue. 1 54

Further, the core content of many U . S . treaties is to constrain executive

action, not to embolden it.

As noted by Professors Derek Jinks and Neal

Katyal, much of international law, including treaties, is designed to act as a
constraint on executive power. 155 By expanding the level of deference to ex
ecutive interpretations
advantages of

in such contexts under Chevron , "any practical
[Chevron] j udicial deference are substantially offset by the

costs of assigning robust interpretive authority to the very agency that is

regulated by the regime . " 1 56

The Geneva Conventions serve as a comp e lling example of this danger.

The Conventions create a framework in which the Executive, charged with

military operations, must operate. The Conventions have been implemented
through Army regulations, which provide, "In the event of conflicts or

1�9. See id. at 23? ("Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it
pro�ides for a relauvely formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and
.
dehberatw
n tha� should underlie a pronouncement of such force ").
.
1 50. See Michael P. V� �lstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation 90 CAL. L. REV.
,
1 2�3, 1 300.:-01 (�002) (descn�mg the quest10nable foundation for deference
where a private right of
acti n provides little opportunity for the administration of executive
agencies ).
5 1 . See Evan Criddle, Comment, Chevron Deference and Treaty
Interpretation ' 1 1 2 YALE L.J.
1927_, 193 1 n.23 (2003) ("Treatie s' contractual character helps
explain why few if any treaties
.
provide textual support for an impli.ed de1egatiOn
o f Interpretive authonty to municipal executive
.
agencies.").

�

'

·

·

'

·

·

1_52. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The Presiden
t] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties ,
provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur . . . . ,).

& Katyal, supra note 1 34, at 1 25 3 .
1 54. See id. (discussing how the S enate can 1iffilt
the discretion of courts by defining the
constramts and a11owance s to the Executive within
treaties ).
1 5 3 . Jinks

·

·

1 5 5 . !d. at 1 265.

1 5 6. !d. at 1 244-45.

·

·

·
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discre anc ie : between this regulation and the Geneva Conventions, the
�
.
prov1s1ons of the Geneva Conventions take precedence." 157
Treaty

law

differs

from

admini strative

law

substantively

and

procedu ally. Trca �y law, at a fundamental level, is designed to influence
�
nd out mc appropnate state behavior. 1 58 As articulated by scholars, much of
�
mtcmat10nal law is executive constraining in nature . 1 59 Increased deference

�

to the Executiv ' s interpretation of executive-constraining law enables the
�
.
Execut1vc
to c i rc umvent regulations previously established.
Where the
power to interpret law creates the power to evade intended regulation, the
.
power to mtcrprct
law con stitutes the power to break such law.

2.

Institutionally Driven Deference: A Flexible Model

.-

Courts clearly

consider factors o utside of those accounted for in theories of total deference
no deference, great weight, and Chevron-style deference.

more clearly demonstrated than in

Nowhere is thi

�

Hamdan. The maj ority decision, finding

the incorporation of the Geneva Conventions through the Uniform Code of
Mil itary Justice and extending Common Article

3

protections to those de

tained at G uantanamo Bay, conspicuously granted no deference. 1 60

The

Court's explanation, which tersely characterized the governme nt ' s proposed
interpretation

"erroneous, " 1 6 1

of

the

language

indicated

that

ambiguity or reasonableness.

it

"not

of an

considered

international
factors

other

character"
than

as

textual

While unarticulated by the Court, clearly the

substance of the treaty and the boundaries of executive power were core con

cerns in the litigation as a whole. Additionally, the Executive 's inconsistent

application of standards relevant to the treaty and Common Article

3

in par

ticular undermined the credibility of its position, making the Court less likely
to defer. 1 62
The concerns animating

Hamdan represent judicial discomfort with

making deference determinations without considering all relevant factors. A
flexible model o f deference faci litates structuring and assessing an examina

tion

of

the

validity

of

the

executive

interpretation

countervailing aspects of the proposed interpretation.

and

potentially

As demonstrated in

Hamdan, concerns such as self-interest, specialization, and process already
drive the inconsistent application of deference in current j urisprudence.

1 5 7 . U.S. Dep'ts of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, Army Regulation
1 90-8/0PNAV INST 346 1 .6/AFJI 3 1 -304/MCO 346 1 . 1 , Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees § 1 - 1 (4) ( 1997), available at http://www.au.af.
miVau/awc/awcgate/law/ar 1 90-8.pdf.
1 58. Van Alstine ' supra note ! 50, at 1270.
ining zone" of
1 59. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 1 34, at 1 234 (defining the "executive-constra
foreign-relations law).
1 60. H amdan v. Rumsfe ld, 1 26 S. Ct. 2749, 2789-98 (2006).

1 6 1 . !d. at 2795, 2795-96.
the functional
1 62. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1 773 (describing Hamdan .as a case in w�ich
not agree
justi fication for judicial deference is undermined because executive-branch entities d1d
among themselves on the correct interpretation of the treaty).
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Current doctrine encourages a binary decision between total deference and
no deference by the courts that

(1)

may be more results oriented than princi

lacks nuance and structure in providing an answer as to
.
why some treaties-and some cases involving thos e t�eat1es-ar� �ated
.
differently. A principled system of deference that mamta ms the
to
.
.
consider factors outside o f basic reasonablene s s and amb1gmty can ehrmnate

ple oriented, and

(2)

�

flex1�1h�

that deficiency.

a.

Skidmore 's

Adapting

Flexible

Scale

to

Treaties.-The

"persuasiveness" standard articulated i n the Supreme Court' s decision in

Skidmore

v.

Swift & Co. provides a starting p oint for developing a flexible
Under Skidmore, an

model of deference appropriate to treaty interpretation.

agency' s statutory interpretations are "not controlling upon the courts," and
the weight accorded

an

agency interpretation "in a particular case will de

pend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade."1 63 Skidmore instructs the
Judiciary to assess whether the agency' s interpretation is made "in pursuance
o f official duty, based upon more specialized experience and broader investi
gations and information than is likely to come t o a judge in a particular case"

a s well as whether the agency in question determines governmental policy
164
and is charged with providing guidance for the statute ' s enforcement.

Skidmore offers a model of deference that recognizes the special status

o f the Executive and grants deference to the extent that the government's
operation within that status-and the substantive law that grants such
status-imbue the Executive ' s interpretation with persuasiveness.
A primary
formulating an

particularities
instruments;

consideration

intermediate

of treaties .

in

favoring

system
Treaties

of
are

Skidmore over Chevron in
deference

(1)

both

is

based

political

on

and

the

legal

(2) drafted by the Executive B ranch; (3) ratified by the
Legislature through consent; and (
typically constrain both foreign and
domestic action. The nature of treaties a s legal and political devices means
�hat there are compelling justifications for providing deference to executive
JUdgments as to how they operate and should be interpreted. Judicial actions

4)

that contravene executive foreign policy can harm national foreign policy
and compromise the ability of the Executiv e to speak with one voice. At the
same ime, tr atie s create obligations that are designed to have the force of
�
. .
law tth the Imphctt
corresponding respons ibility of the Judiciary to provide
�
meanmg to that l aw. Treaties are not unilater al actions by the Executive;
rather, they acquire the force of law through legislat
ive review and consent.
Unwarranted ef rence to executive treaty interpretations
of instruments
.
�
purportmg to lmut executive actions and that are
interpreted inconsistently

�

�

163. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 1 34, 140 ( 1 944).
1 64. ld. at 1 39, 1 3 9-40.
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�xecutive

81 1

B r nc compro mises separati on-of-powers principl es
�
.
and undennmes the mstitutw nal advanta ges the Judiciary confers through
judicial review.

�

Skidmore deferenc e in the admin istrative realm weighs deference to
agenc decision on the fo llowing factors : ( 1 ) validity of reasonin g; (2)
�
expertise; (3) the fonn in which the interpretation was issued; and (4)
whether its views were thoroughly considered and consistently applied. 1 65

The application of these factors has been consolidated into a general
articulation of persuasiven ess deference based on the Court' s own language
that it could consider "in a particular case . . . all those factors which give it
power to persuade. " 1 116 The nature of this persuasiveness is often conflated

commentators as to whether the agency interpretation itself is
7
persuasive. 1 6
In reality, the Skidmore factors are assigned the task of
assessing the persuasiveness of applying deference to the agency or official

by

making the interpretive deci sion in question.

One might argue that the availabil ity of such a broad range of factors to
the Judiciary would operate e ssentially as nondeference. 1 68 It has not played

out in the administrative realm in that way and is even less likely to be the

Skidmore contemplates a more active (and thus
Chevron; however, it does so on
measurable planes that enforce accountabi lity for the Judiciary.16 9 Skidmore
case in regards to treaties.

less deferential) role for the Judiciary than

enforces judicial deference in that courts are precluded from ignoring agency
interpretation, and if ultimately contradicting agency action, they must pro
vide a justification consistent with the factors outlined by Skidmore or
articulate some new factor that led them to their conclusion . 1 70 In any event,

1 65. See id. at 1 39-40 ( discussing, explicitly and implicitly, various factors that courts should
consi der when weighing the persuasiveness of a particular agency interpretation of a statute); see
also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron 's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 853-56
(200 1 ) (discussing the di fferences between Chevron deference and Skidmore deference and
expanding on the factors courts consider when applying Skidmore deference). Although the Court
in Skidmore never lists out a fixed set of factors, these four factors capture the essence of the
Court's flexible approach to deference to agency action.
166. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 1 40.
1 67. See, e.g. , Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 1 01
COLUM. L. REV. 1 749, 1 807 ( 2007); Daniel J. Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of a Revised Chevron
Doctrine: Congressional Intent. Judicial Judgment, and Administrative Autonomy, 59 ADMIN. L.
REv. 783, 784 (2007).
1 68 . See Molly A. Leckey & Stephanie A. Roy, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Administrative Law, 7 2 G�o. WASH. L. RE�. 946, 954
(2004) (arguing that under Skidmore, "the court will simply engage m a de novo revtew of the
statute through the use of traditional tools of statutory interpretation, and if by chance, the a�ency's
interpretation matches the court's de novo interpretation, only then will the court grant Skidmore
deference to the agency's construct ion").
.
1 69. At the margins. any system for deference is subject to mampul�tion.

.
Miles &
.
Sunstein, supra note 1 36, at 847 (showing empirically that independent judtctal decisiOns applymg
Chevron are largely motivated by ideology).
1 70. See Merrill & H ickman, supra note 1 65, at 8 5 5 ("Skidmore is properly regarded as a
deference doctrine because the court cannot ignore the agency interpretation-the court must assess
.

.

�ee
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�

ideo l gical
tion of artic u lated stan dard s fo
the prospect of j udic ial manipula
r
s
usse d abov e, c ntcm pora ry J udge mt
ends may be a red herring. As disc
utive
exec
turn
over
onstrate no destre to
preting and applying treaties dem

�

�

171

um'1 atera11 y.
.
.
pretatwns
.
.
mter
.
m assessm g
vc
t
uas
"pers
as
d
ulate
artic
t
Cour
The factors the Skidmore
o n deference arc of the � arne variety
the proper amou nt of agency-interpretati
_
degre es of defer ence m the treaty
that create a comp elling case for varyi ng
the instru ment i n quest ion; and
context: executive self-interest; expertise;
,

process and consi stenc y.

l i ned by Skidmorf!
Self-in terest. The "validity of reason ing" prong out
sts that may affect the
has been interpreted to encompass agency s e l f-intere
1 72
The J udiciary
appropriate level of deference due agency i nterpretation.
part icularly
should consider the substance of the treaty regime at issue.
whether the treaty purports to regulate (and thus constra i n ) core executive

powers.
As discussed above, a key aspect of international law is the regulation
of state activity.

The underlying concern regarding this inq u i ry i s the degree

of self-interest possessed by the Executive

its

in

interp retation.

interested interpretation is likely to arise in circumstances

Self

in which the

relevant treaty question is the very nature of power in the E x ecutive.

If the

purpose of the treaty regime at issue is to constrain the Executive. it would be
a paradox to allow the Executive to r e interpret a treaty to avoid the constraint
at issue. That paradox would encourage greater consol i dation of presidential
power without any concurrent checks on the e xercise of that p o wer.
While unarticulated, substance-related concerns like l y arise for the
Supreme Court regarding the i nterpretation of the Geneva Conventions
offered by the Executive in Hamdan.

Even though Common Article 3 was

logically amenable to more than a single interpretation, the incentive for the
Executive to choose the interpretation that e nhanced its own power was
great.
Obviously, the fact that a treaty' s subj ec t matter touches on executive
power does not, by itself, require the Judiciary to decrease its deference to an

�

that interpretat on again t multiple factors and determi
ne what weight they should be given. After
�
undertaking th1s analysis however
agency mterpretatwns receive various degrees of deference.
·
rangmg from none, to shght, to great . . . ).
.
·

'

.

·

·

•

"

1 7 1 . A greater concern arises in the · r
·
I misgui
d e d attempts to gauge the effects on fore ign
.
relations that their own sdectswn
ght • cur •.f they were to decide against the
Ex ecuti ve's
position. See Goldsmith upra no e
' at 1 96 (d1scu ssmg the "foreign relatio
ns e ffects test").
1 72 . See T.Imothy K . Armstrong Chcvron
De
.r.
Jer�nce
,
and Agency Sel:fnterest. 1 3 CORNELL
.
t
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203 267 (2004) notm
g that unlike Sk,dmOI e, nowhere under Chevro is it
(
n
"proper for a court to m asure the reasona
b leness o f an agencY s m 1erpretat10n
agamst the cntenon
of the agency' s self-interest").
·

·

•

�

·

: �:

;

�

·

'

.
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execut ve

interpretation.
This is especiall y true when
.
1 3
authonzat10n relevant to the interpretive i ssue i s present. 7

�

Expertise.
executive

congressional

As Skidmore recognized, the amount of deference due an

interpretation

should

somewhat

vary based o n the

level of

expertise possessed by the interpreting agent.
The basis for the Executive ' s expertise in treaties stems from its

position as the drafting agent of the United States.

Interpretive questions

often turn on the intent of the parties to the treaty, and the Executive pos
sesses some inherent special ized knowledge from that role. Further, treaties
vary in the amount of formal record and commentary produced during the

drafting and consummation of the agreement. The greater the volume of the
official record, the less the Judiciary i s reliant on executive assertions as to
the meaning, intent, or purpose of the language.
The

Executive

may

also possess

special

knowledge

about treaty

application. As the everyday executor of treaty obligations, the Executive is
forced to make interpretive decisions consistent with its international obliga
tions as well as corresponding international-relations pressures . The process

by which those deci sions are made, often i n cooperation with treaty partners,
can offer additional expertise that would be relevant to a revie wing court.

Instrument.

The courts should consider the type of i nstrument the

Executive is interpreting.

In addition to Article II treaties, the Executive

effectuates international agreements through s o le executive agreements and
congressional-executive agreements.
At one end o f a Skidmore-inspired model of deference, sole executive
agreements should be g i ven the greatest level of deference. Unlike Article II
treaties, executive agreements do not constitute supreme federal law and tend
4
to effectuate political rather than legal ends. 1 7 More importantly, they are
concluded without the

involvement

o f the

Legislative

Branch

of the

1 73. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 n.23 (2006) (noting that the President

"may not disregard limitations that Congress has, i n proper exercise of its own war powers, placed

on his powers"); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 ( 1952) (holding an
executive order seizing steel mills unconstitutional because congressional legislation on .the subject
gave the Executive no such right). This is not to say, however, that there are no hm1tatwns on the
ability of the political branches to preclude or mandate an interpretive issue to the Judiciary without
altering the status of the underlying treaty as supreme federal law. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006) (stating that if treaties are to be treated as supreme federal law,
"determining their meaning as a matter of federal law ' is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department"' (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) 1 37, 1 7 7 ( 1 803))).
t by
1 74. See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: International Claim Settlemen
the President 44 HARV. JNT ' L L.J. ! , 1 3 (2003) ("Whatever the appropriate line between sole
executive agr ements and treaties, the text of the Constitution seems. clear that o�ly tr�aties have the
.
force of domestic Jaw."). One example is the requirement of the diSmissal of htigatwn m o�der to
avo id additional litigation or political turmoil with another nation. See Agreement Concemmg the
Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future," U.S.-F.R. G., Ju � 1 7: 2000, 9 I.L.M.
1298 (outlining the agreement between the United States and Germany that htlgatwn relatmg. to the
Holocaust be dismisse d in favor of a German administrative solution des1gned to prov1de restltutwn

�

�

for victims of the H olocaust).

�
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ly tied to ��ecutive action and
government and thus can be exclu siv �
accountabil ity. The absence of
executive aims for purposes of demo cratic
also places the Executive in
cross-institutional excha nge with the Legis lature
a special positio n as to an agreement ' s mean i ng.
ive Branch and
Article II treatie s are made partia lly outsid e the Execut
1 1s
The
Iause.
C
acy
constitute suprem e federal law under the Suprem
thus substantially
Executive ' s positio n as "keeper" of an A rticle I I treaty is
Consent" 1 76 is it
and
limited, and the constitutional require ment of "Advice
act without
self a limitatio n on the ability of the Executi ve to interpre tively
the endorsement of the Legislative Branch.

As the genre of international agreement that owes its generation to the

greatest amount of cross-institutional exchange and, correspondingly, to the
least amount of unfettered executive action, congressional-executive agree

ments would require the least amount o f deference.

Executive interpretations should be granted

Process and Consistency.

greater deference in contexts in which the Executive has demonstrated a con

sistent interpretive tact or in which Executive policy
established interpretation of the treaty at issue. 1 77

is

reliant on an

In addition to serving as a general indicator that the treaty interpretation
proffered by the Executive is an act o f good faith, consistent interpretations
by the Executive may create reliance, any deviation from which may cause
the Executive to undertake a substantial burden.

This consistency-and-reliance theme is procedurally enhanced when the

Executive is required via treaty to participate in international forums de
signed to monitor U . S . treaty comp liance or for treaty adjudication.

This

circumstance arises frequently, for instance, i n the realm of human rights
treaties . 1 78 In circumstances where the Executive adheres to a consistent

interpretation of treaty obligations in such international forums, courts should
enhance deference.

This procedural consideration i s also relevant in circumstan ces where
the United States engages in comp l i ance supervision of treaty partners
179
through a mechanism within the treaty or as part of a reciprocal agreement.

1 75 . U.S. CONST. art. VI.
1 76. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
1 77. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 1 34, 1 40 ( 1944).
1 78 . See, e.g. , Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to
Influence States: Socialization and
.
Internatzonal Human Rights Law 54 DUKE L J 62
1 688 (2004) (descn· bmg
the mom'tonng
·
.
.
reqUlreme ts of the SIX maJor human nghts treatiesto many of which the United States is a
�
party-whtch mc1ude the regular submission of
compliance reports to a supervisory organ of the
treaty body).
·

.

'

·

·

,

.

l
1 79 . . See, e.g. , Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice
of the United States Relating to
nternatzonal Law 82 AM J INT'L L 336
348 ( 1 988) (hstmg monitoring by the United State s
.
�o �g:;o��tons inFan��s-control and disarmament treaty between the United States and the
.
d Compulsory Licensing: Has the
· Comment, AIDS, Anthrax,
U ie
t tes
e Any h �·? A Comment on Recent DeciSion
s on the International Intellectual
Property Rights 0r
':! Pharmaceuflcal Patents , 9 ILSA J INT'L
& COMP. L. 185, 1 96 (2002) (observing
.
'

.
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In those ci rcum s tan ces the rec i pro ca l nat ure o f the treaty obl igations at issue
.

and the ability of U . S . treaty partners to
and value are compromised .

b.

en

g a ge

in j udgments of prediction

The L in e Between Skidmore and C hc vron .

Skidm ore deference

-

effectuates a meaningful d i fference from the type and source of deference
available under Che,·twl, where deference is l imited to c i rcumstances in
which Congress has d e l egat e d lawmaking authority. This c rucial dimension

in Chevron is irrelevant in .\'kidmore. as long as the Executive possesses the

requisite expertise in the subject matter being interpreted.

Chevron deference act s as a bi nary operation. Once the determination is
made that the text is ambiguous. the Judic iary is left to determine reason
ableness and, if reasonable, adopt the agency interpretation .

Skidmore

deference operates on a s l iding scale, enabl ing the Judiciary to give defer

ence to the agenc y ' s interpretation along a spectrum from very little to very
strong deference. 1 110
While

Chevron ' s

considerations

also

reasonableness

re levant

under

assessment

Skidmore,

determination has focused on rationality, not process.

sweeps

the

m

some

reasonableness

Skidmore enab les the

courts to assess the consistency of the Executive in its interpretations, as well
as the relevance of the substantive matters at issue-neither of which consid

eration s are given much weight in the Chevron-deference context . 1 8 1

The concerns animating the growth of the Chevron doctrine, and
particularly the issue of respecting congressional delegation, should not be
discarded to incorporate

Skidmore deference i n foreign affairs. The i ncorpo
ration of Skidmore considerations in cases purporting to apply Chevron has

shown, according to Judge Richard Posner, that recent Supreme Court

jurisprudence

"suggests a merger between Chevron deference and
Skidmore's and Glover' s approach of varying the deference that agency deci

sio ns receive in accordance with the circumstances. " 1 82 Judge Easterbrook,
in con currence, maintained that whi l e he did "not perceive . . . any 'merger"'

that China's obligations relating to its negotiated accession to the World Trade Organization would
be monitor ed by the United States).
180. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 165, at 855 ("Skidmore is properly regarded as a

deference doctrine because the court cannot ignore the agency interpretation-the court must assess
that interpretation against multiple factors and determine what weight t ey should be given. After
_
,
undertaking this analysis, however, agency interpretations recetve vanous degrees of deference
ranging from none, to slight, to great, depending on the court's assessment of the strength of the

�

agency interpretation under consideration.").
.
( 1 99 1 ) (statl�g that an
1 8 1 . Id. at 856; see, e.g. , Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U . . 173 , 187, 1 � 6-87
_
_
tl still e
agency's interpretation that breaks dramatically from 1ts p�or postttOn on a �atter _
ts
and
questton
m
afforded deference so tong as it is a permissible constructiOn of the statute
State
v.
Inc.
,
.
S
.
U
the
of
Ass'n
Mfrs.
Vehicle
justified by a "reasoned analysis" (quoting Motor

�

wl

�

Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 ( 1 983))).
.
Cir. 2002); see id. (relymg on
1 82. Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 3 1 4 F.3d 875, 879 (7th
_
thnes co�tderanon� the Supreme
language from Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 2 1 2 (2002) that o�
IS appropnately apphed).
nce
defere
n
Chevro
when
g
decidin
Court has found persuasive in
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were two doctr ines that acted alongside
between Skidmore and Chevron, they
1 3
each other. 8
favor of the adoption of a
The reject ion of fixed-point deference in
does not preclude, but rather
Skidm oresque rule in treaty interpretatio n
in circum sta �ces where the
embraces, stronger Chevronesq ue defere nce
the Leg1slature and en
Executive has been granted implie d delega tion from
notice -and-c omme�t :ute
gaged in some type of extens ive proces s, such as
n concerns w1thm a
making . The incorporation of such quinte ssentia l Chevro
framework to
larger framew ork also highlights the attracti veness of a flexible
create calibrated deferenc e.

V.

Conclusion

a
The inextricable morass of doctrine in treaty interpretation betrays
articu
doctrine without c ogent theory. The challenge for the Judiciary is to
political
the
both
late a c lear and principled theory o f deference that respects
and legal nature o f treaties, and expands and contracts as circumstances
reqmre .
As demonstrated above, systems of deference designed to fix the level
of deference at no deference or total deference are impractical largely due to
their inelasticity.

In no-deference

systems,

realities that the

political

Executive faces in treaty execution are given no weight, and the courts are
left to construe the meaning of the treaty in question within the strict legal
confines of the text and history of the instrument. 1 84 Similarly, total defer
ence undermines the status of treati e s as supreme federal law by providing

them no weight as legal instruments , despite the fact that the core substance
of much of treaty law is specifically designed to constrain the Executive in its
actions.
Chevron deference is designed to overcome these objections through its
5
emphasis on ambiguity1 8 and reasonableness, thus providing a meaningful
judicial role while ceding substantial ground to the Executive's prerogative
of discretion and flexibility in foreign affairs.

As noted above, the Chevron

model relies on presumptions of c o ngressional delegation and executive

1 83. ld. at 882 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("I do not perceive in Walton any 'merger' .
between Chevron and Skidmore, which Mead took such pains to distinguish. HUD ' s interpretation
ts on the Skidmore side of the line.").
1 84. Further, any such history is frequently, if not usually,
sparse and inconsistent.
1 8 5 . Professors Posner and Sunstein emphasized that
any such ambiguity must be genuine
before any controversy as to the propriety of executive action
should arise. See Posner & Sunstein,
supra note 69 , at 1 1 78 (emphasizing that their
analysis is restricted to instances of genuine
.
ambtgmty m the �overning law and would not apply to
clear congressional mandates, even with
.
respect to mtema
t10nal law created through seIf-executmg treaties or treaties given domestic eftiect
.
.
bY clear �ongress t nal act10n).
Professors Jinks and Katyal on the other hand point out the
?
.
mherent difficulty m detennmmg
· ·
whether sueh ambtgwty
· IS
· genume. See Jinks & Katyal supra
.
note 134, at 1269 (argum
·
g that "genume
·
am
b"
1gu1ty
has
no
consistently measurable standard as,
.
.
consciously or unconsciOus
· · ty m
·
ly' amb!gut
· the 1 aw IS often Identified in line with latent pohcy
goal s) .
.
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specialization, which are frequently not at play i n treaty interpretation.

The

result is a system that does not track the core issues at p l ay i n treaty
interpretation-deference questions.
The

inadequacies

of these

systems,

coupled with

the

increasing

importance of treaties. requires implementing a model of deference that
accounts for relevant factors that have caused the Judiciary to engage i n such
186
inconsistent application o f the great weight doctrine.
As demonstrated by
the discussion
deference.

above,

different

ci rcumstances

require

varied

levels

of

A model of deference based on the persuasiveness factors

outlined in Skidmore moves us to a more flexible model of deference that can
be tailored to address the dual concerns o f the Judiciary and Executive. This
calibrated scale, with factors addressing the particularities of treaties, is the
only way to effectuate the obl igations and rights encompassed within the
domestic realm while respecting their rol e in international relations.

t of continuing
at 1 300 ("[W]ithout an entrustmen
186. See Van Alstm e, supra note 1 50'
g-scale deference
slidin
a
is
s
a
remam
t
wh
cy,
agen
.
.
adm inistrative authority to an executive-branch
ti on of a treaty and
ered executive-branch mterpreta
cali brated to the over all persuasiveness of a proff
'
s.").
to any impli cations for our nation s foreign affair
·

·

